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 — The last four years have confirmed that the choices the US makes are highly 
consequential for international politics. Even as geopolitical competition 
and globalization limit the range of available foreign policy options, the next 
president will determine how America’s diplomatic, economic and military 
resources are invested, and, especially, what value the US will attach to existing 
alliances and multilateral institutions. Whoever sits in the White House will 
shape the trajectory of the US–China relationship and the global economy, 
with significant implications for America’s partners.
 — The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored, at often shocking scale, the urgent 
need for competent state interventions and capable leadership. The priority for 
the next president will be to lead the US out of a public health crisis that by mid-
October had caused the deaths of more than 213,000 Americans, and to assure 
the economic recovery. Pressure to tackle the deep-rooted racial and economic 
inequalities that have been thrown into sharp relief over the past months 
will not dissipate.
 — The choices made by the next US president will have a crucial impact on climate 
action, international trade and technology policy, and global cooperation on 
health. These global challenges raise fundamental questions about the balance 
between national sovereignty, liberal values and multilateralism. 
 — President Trump’s disregard for the value of science and expertise has risked 
permanent damage to research and innovation in the US, and the effects of this 
will be felt globally. The willingness of the next US president to push the reset 
button and ensure that these elements are once again fostered and respected 
within decision-making processes will be essential in restoring America’s 
global image and soft power.
 — European leaders are waiting to see whether the US will renew its commitment 
to the transatlantic partnership, and to critical multilateral institutions like 
NATO. This is all the more important in light of Russian adventurism, and as 
tensions between the US and China accelerate.
 — Values are gaining increased prominence in US foreign policy, driven not least 
by the China challenge. Ensuring consistency in the administration’s approach 
to democracy and human rights will be essential. Success on this dimension will 
depend, vitally, on upholding democratic norms and addressing social fractures 
at home. The US will also need to work closely with its democratic partners to 
create and enable viable and sustainable policy innovations that help meet the 
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There probably hasn’t been a US presidential election of such significance for 
the future of the country, its values and its alliances as this year’s contest since, 
well, the last one.
The choices facing America’s voters are stark. A president who accepts constitutional 
checks and balances, or one who seeks to bend everything to his will – police, 
judiciary, intelligence agencies, the media, even the US Postal Service? Working 
with allies, or going it alone? Supporting or undermining international institutions 
and arms control agreements? Acting on climate change, or doubling down on 
oil, gas and coal? Tax reform, or just more breaks for those least in need of them? 
Standing up for democracy, truth and basic freedoms, or undermining them at home 
while accommodating dictators and strongmen abroad?
The experience of the last four years, and Donald Trump’s reluctance so far 
to provide a coherent explanation of why he wants to be re-elected, suggest that 
a second term for the incumbent would be much like the first, and just as subject 
to the president’s mood swings, personal likes and dislikes – at home and 
abroad – and egregious Twitter style.
Of course, whoever wins on 3 November will find his freedom of manoeuvre 
severely constrained by how successful the US, and the world, is at countering 
COVID-19. A Biden administration would nevertheless be very different. He may 
not have won a single primary in two previous runs at the White House, but many 
of the policies we can expect Biden to follow, and the people he is likely to appoint, 
have been fully road-tested during the Clinton and Obama years. ‘No need for 
training wheels’, as veteran Democratic strategist John Podesta puts it.
An early priority is likely to be the formulation of a new national security strategy. 
How to show foes and friends alike that ‘America is back’? What to do about China? 
How to manage Putin? Should the US re-engage in the Middle East and South 
Asia? If so, how?
There have been suggestions that, among other resets, a Biden presidency would 
be more inclined to look to Germany as its principal European ally than keep 
‘the special relationship’ with the UK in pride of place.
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Perhaps. Germany and France are undoubtedly the dominant players in the EU. 
But Merkel will be leaving the stage soon. As for the UK, the government’s handling 
of Brexit and COVID-19 has done serious damage: politically, economically, socially, 
and to its international standing. Even so, it remains a – if not the – go-to partner 
for the US when it comes to intelligence, defence, cybersecurity, international 
development and counterterrorism; and it could even regain its position as foreign 
policy partner of choice if it can recover its flair for diplomacy.
But this will need work. It will not be lost on Biden that the last two British prime 
ministers have gone out of their way to humour Donald Trump, and he believes 
Brexit was an avoidable act of harm, pushed by political opportunists, to both the 
UK and its close allies. As a proud Irish-American, Biden has already warned that 
he will take a dim view of any UK moves around the completion of Brexit at the 
end of this year that risk undermining the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
Some things will not change, whoever wins. Donald Trump is as much symptom 
as cause of the different kind of America the world is now witnessing. The US will 
be robust towards China. There will be differing views on the value of tariff wars, 
but trade deals won’t be any easier to conclude under Biden than under Trump. 
The fossil fuel industry will continue its well-funded lobbying. So long as Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard continues its destructive interference across the wider Middle 
East, and its government continues to disregard human rights, any fresh nuclear 
agreement with Tehran will be hard to achieve.
So big challenges and choices lie ahead. But first, the world needs to see that the 
leader of the free world is still capable of organizing free and fair elections, despite 
Trump’s efforts to delegitimize his opponents and convince his supporters that the 






For the next administration, leading America’s recovery from 
COVID-19 and addressing social and economic inequities at 
home will be necessary first steps in building international 
support to address the most important global challenges.
Leslie Vinjamuri
America is at an inflection point. The outcome of the 2020 presidential election 
will determine whether the coming four years see a further withdrawal from 
international engagement, a deepening of domestic divisions, and an ongoing 
assault on democratic norms, or whether the tide may yet be turned.
Some things are already certain, and, for these, the election may matter less. The 
US’s relationship with China will continue to dominate foreign policy, and there is 
broad agreement that the US should take a tougher line. Those who feel they have 
lost out as a result of globalization have been given a powerful voice in US domestic 
politics over the last four years. Therefore, the US is unlikely to push the reset button 
on China, on globalization, and especially on free trade, anytime soon.
But the last four years have confirmed that, even where geopolitical competition 
and globalization limit the range of available policy options, the choices that the US 
president makes are highly consequential for international affairs. These choices 
are increasingly unconstrained, as the power of the executive has continued to 
grow.1 The next president will shape the trajectory of the US–China relationship 
and the global economy, and the implications will be especially significant for 
America’s partners.
1 Binder, S., Goldgeier, J. and Saunders, E. (2020), ‘The Imperial Presidency is Alive and Well’, Foreign Affairs, 
21 January 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-01-21/imperial-presidency-alive-and-well 
(accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
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European policymakers are aware that the president has considerable influence 
over the US’s commitment to its transatlantic partners. It is conceivable that, in 
a second term, Donald Trump might attempt to withdraw the US from NATO. 
A Trump or a Biden presidency will also make very different choices about the 
optimal path for securing regional stability in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
US policy on climate change, arms control, global health and technology will 
all be shaped by the outcome of November’s election. 
For the US, as for the rest of the world, dealing with the health, social and economic 
impacts of the COVID-19 crisis means that the overwhelming immediate priority will 
be to ensure a domestic recovery. The next president will need to lead the US out 
of the worst public health crisis in a generation, which by mid-October had caused 
the deaths of more than 213,000 Americans, and to restore the health of the US 
economy. Pressures to tackle the deep-rooted racial and economic inequalities that 
have been thrown into sharp relief over the past months look set to continue. 
In light of the Trump administration’s catastrophic response to the pandemic, 
at home, but also internationally, it is hardly surprising that the US’s global 
standing has been diminished. The assault on democratic norms over the last four 
years has also contributed to this. Whether the US can restore its global influence 
in the years ahead will depend crucially on the next president’s ability to reverse 
these failings and address the deep economic and social fractures at home.
Respect for scientific rigour and expertise will be critical. What happens in 
the election will have a profound impact on the connection between science, 
expertise, public discourse and policy formation in the US. And the effects of 
this will reverberate globally. The US has cultivated an environment for world-
leading innovation and research in the post-war era, and this has both contributed 
directly to policymaking and been a central aspect of America’s soft power. The 
last four years, however, have seen a rejection of science even at the highest 
levels of US public authority, in favour of grandstanding and rhetorical attacks 
on experts and expertise.
President Trump’s America
Campaigning for the presidency in 2016, on a wave of growing populism, 
Donald Trump undertook to renegotiate the US’s international role. Americans, 
he told the electorate, had been taken for a ride, and it was time to reclaim the 
benefits of globalization for themselves. He promised to tear up multilateral 
commitments in favour of bilateral deals and tough bargaining that would deliver 
greater benefits to the nation at the expense of both rivals and long-term allies. 
Trump’s pledge to bring manufacturing jobs back home resonated in particular 
with white non-college-educated men, whose belief in his message that he would 
redistribute wealth to their advantage helped to assure his victory.
7 Chatham House
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Four years later, Trump has overseen the consolidation of a political consensus 
that trade deals should be fair more than free, and that China is at the root of 
many of the most critical global imbalances.2 But his solutions have focused 
narrowly on tariff wars and failed to level the playing field with China or to identify 
a domestic strategy for inclusive growth that delivers tangible economic benefits, 
especially to working-class Americans. The Congressional Budget Office forecast 
in early 2020 that tariffs imposed by the Trump administration since 2018 would 
leave the average household almost $1,300 worse off over the year.3 Inequality 
in the US has also continued to grow;4 and Trump’s promise to invest in domestic 
infrastructure has not yet translated into practice.5
Under Trump’s presidency, the US has stepped away from its role as liberal 
leader. In doing so, the US has often antagonized its closest allies, especially 
in Europe, while giving strongmen in Russia, North Korea and the Philippines, 
among others, a free pass on human rights. The administration has delivered on 
Trump’s pre-election promise to reduce the US’s multilateral commitments, not 
least by withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 
UN Human Rights Council, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. It has given formal 
notice of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (due to take effect the day after 
the 2020 election); and, most recently, has initiated America’s withdrawal from the 
World Health Organization. Trump has also undercut the functioning of the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) appellate body, and has at times wrecked efforts by 
the G7 to coordinate its members’ positions on key issues. And his administration 
has spurred a surge of protectionism globally.6
But Trump has failed to deliver many of his key foreign policy promises. 
China has not made adjustments to its model of state capitalism that would 
deliver on the president’s ambition to ‘level the playing field’. Instead, the US–China 
relationship has deteriorated substantially. Trump’s summit diplomacy with Kim 
Jong-un has failed to deliver substantial progress towards the denuclearization 
of the Korean peninsula. And the strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ against Tehran 
that followed the US’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 has failed to bring 
Iran back to the negotiating table.
Efforts in line with Trump’s pledge to reduce US troop commitments in the Middle 
East have had mixed success, and have been met with the stubborn reality of facts 
on the ground. In the autumn of 2019, Trump announced that he would remove 
2 Ikenson, D. (2020), ‘The Bipartisan Consensus to Destroy U.S. Trade Policy’, CATO Institute, 1 July 2020, 
https://www.cato.org/blog/bipartisan-consensus-destroy-us-trade-policy; Shambaugh, D. (2018), ‘The New American 
Bipartisan Consensus on China Policy’, China US Focus, 21 September 2018, https://www.chinausfocus.com/
foreign-policy/the-new-american-bipartisan-consensus-on-china-policy (accessed 12 Oct. 2020).
3 Congressional Budget Office (2020), ‘The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030’, https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/56073 (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
4 Telford, T. (2019), ‘Income inequality in America is the highest it’s been since Census Bureau started tracking 
it, data shows’, Washington Post, 26 September 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/
income-inequality-america-highest-its-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
5 In 2018, for example, a study undertaken by the University of Pennsylvania found that: ‘On net, the budget 
appears to lead to little new federal spending on infrastructure, potentially even resulting in a reduction in public 
spending.’ See University of Pennsylvania (2018), ‘Changes to federal infrastructure spending in the White House 
FY 2018 Budget’, https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2018/2/9/changes-to-federal-infrastructure-
spending-in-the-white-house-fy-2018-budget (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
6 Bank of England (2019), ‘In focus – Trade protectionism and the global outlook. Section 3 of the Monetary 
Policy Report’, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-report/2019/november-2019/in-focus-trade-
protectionism-and-the-global-outlook (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
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US troops from northeast Syria, in effect abandoning the US’s Kurdish partners. 
This produced a backlash at home, even among some of his most loyal supporters, 
and also contributed to further instability in areas affected by the conflict. The US 
quickly reversed the decision, redeploying troops to guard oil facilities from ISIS. 
As the election approaches, the Trump administration has renewed its pledge to 
draw down troops from the region. It has brokered a normalization of relations 
between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, culminating in Trump’s hosting of 
the signing of the ‘Abraham Accords’ at the White House in September 2020. 
But the pursuit of the ‘deal of the century’ – in the form of the Middle East peace 
plan announced by Trump at the beginning of the year – has further sidelined the 
Palestinians, following the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem 
in 2018, and done little to advance a two-state solution.
The collective impact of the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been 
to undermine US influence globally. Moreover, the president’s leadership style has 
compromised the administration’s ability to build international support for realistic 
innovations that might help advance common policy objectives.
For a period, all that was unsettling about Trump’s assertion of presidential authority 
played out in a context of robust job creation, low unemployment and steady 
growth. This was built on the back of a strong economy inherited from the Obama 
administration, and by the president’s own sweeping corporate and individual tax 
cuts. All of this served as a buffer against the effects of the president’s erratic foreign 
policy and divisive politics, and deepening inequalities within the US.
This has now changed. The US’s response to the coronavirus pandemic has been 
catastrophic, and the prospects for suppressing the virus and securing a robust 
economic recovery remain uncertain. The US is home to just 4 per cent of the 
world’s population, but has suffered 22 per cent of all recorded COVID-19 fatalities.7 
Unemployment soared to a record high of 14.7 per cent in April, from 3.5 per cent 
just two months earlier; by September the jobless rate had dipped just below 
8 per cent.8 Despite a remarkable early success in agreeing a bipartisan fiscal 
stimulus, a return to partisan politics has continued to frustrate congressional efforts 
to agree further legislation to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic.9 
7 Hanage, W. P., Testa, C., Chen, J. T., Davis, L., Pechter, E., Santillana, M. and Krieger, N. (2020), ‘COVID-19: 
US Federal accountability for entry, spread, and inequities’, Harvard Center for Population and Development 
Studies Working Paper Volume 20, Number 2, 5 October 2020, https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/
sites/1266/2020/10/20_covid-19_federal-response_FINAL_for-HCPDS_1001_HCPDS-working-paper_volume-20_
number-2_FINAL.pdf (accessed 8 Oct. 2020).
8 US Department of Labor (2020), The Employment Situation – September 2020, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/empsit.pdf (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
9 Politi, J. (2020), ‘Hopes fade for US stimulus with Washington in stalemate’, Financial Times, 7 October 2020, 
https://www.ft.com/content/67d7abb8-3f67-49f5-a16d-f9ecf7e0a03c (accessed 8 Oct. 2020).
The US’s response to the coronavirus pandemic 
has been catastrophic, and the prospects for 
suppressing the virus and securing a robust 
economic recovery remain uncertain.
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The clear failure of the Trump administration to contain the spread of the 
coronavirus matters far beyond America’s borders, and has had a stark effect 
on the US’s standing globally. Polling data released in September 2020 show that 
a median of just 15 per cent of respondents in the 13 countries polled believe the 
US has performed well in its response to the coronavirus.10 
And in May, in the midst of the US outbreak, shocking footage of the police killing 
of an African American man, George Floyd, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, spread 
rapidly online and unleashed a wave of protests against racial injustice across 
the world. Protests continued in the US throughout the summer on a mass scale, 
with deep-seated anger at institutional racism further fuelled, on the eve of the 
Republican National Convention, after an unarmed black man, Jacob Blake, 
was shot seven times in the back by police in Kenosha, Wisconsin. 
The November election
The 2020 US presidential campaign season has been one like no other, and fraught, 
not least as coronavirus infections took hold within the White House itself in the 
final weeks of the election. 
It is hardly surprising that the election looks set to be a referendum on President 
Trump, especially his handling of the coronavirus crisis and the economic crisis it 
has driven. By mid-October 2020, Joe Biden was ahead in the polls by an average 
of around 10 percentage points,11 although this did not mean that the outcome was 
certain. Polls are always subject to a margin of error, and, crucially, it cannot be 
known ahead of election day how many voters will turn out to vote. Likely turnout 
is even less predictable in 2020 because of COVID-19. And in the US, the weighting 
of electoral college votes means that, as happened in 2016, a candidate who loses 
the popular vote can still take the White House.
The focus in the run-up to the election has been on the swing states – especially 
Florida, which has 29 electoral college votes, and Pennsylvania, which shaped 
the outcome of the 2016 election and has this time around been the site of ongoing 
disputes over mail-in ballots.12 An anticipated surge in mail-in ballots has led to 
battles in many states about the rules for recording and counting mail-in votes.13 
This matters in an election in which a far greater proportion of voters who identify 
as Democrats have planned to vote by mail, compared with their Republican 
10 Wike, R., Fetterolf, J. and Mordecai, M. (2020), ‘U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as Most Say Country 
Has Handled Coronavirus Badly’, Pew Research Center, 15 September 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/
global/2020/09/15/us-image-plummets-internationally-as-most-say-country-has-handled-coronavirus-badly 
(accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
11 Polling average taken from Real Clear Politics (2020), ‘General Election: Trump vs Biden’, https://www.realclear 
politics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_biden-6247.html (accessed 8 Oct. 2020).
12 Mejia, E. and Skelley, G. (2020), ‘Is the Electoral Map Changing?’, FiveThirtyEight, 26 August 2020, 
https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/swing-states-2020-election (accessed 14 Oct. 2020).
13 Corasaniti, N. and Vogel, K. (2020), ‘Battles over Voting Rights Fuel Concern About Postelection Fights’, 
New York Times, 24 September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/us/politics/trump-election-voting-
rights.html (accessed 6 Oct. 2020). Meyer, K. (2020), ‘‘Naked Ballot’ Rule Could Lead To Thousands Of Pa. Votes 
Getting Rejected’, NPR, 1 October 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/10/01/918368319/naked-ballot-rule-could-
lead-to-thousands-of-pa-votes-getting-rejected?t=1602009327678 (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
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counterparts, especially in key swing states like Florida and Pennsylvania.14 Despite 
Biden’s clear lead in the polls, the uncertainty surrounding voter turnout, the battles 
over mail-in ballots and the realities of the electoral college mean that the final 
outcome of the election may not be known on the night, if the count is close, and 
a contested election is possible.15 President Trump’s ongoing allegations of fraud 
surrounding mail-in ballots have added to the febrile atmosphere of the pre-election 
period. When asked, in September, to confirm whether he would abide by the most 
fundamental democratic norm, assuring a peaceful transition of power, should he 
lose the election, the president refrained from doing so.16
What the 2020 election means for 
the rest of the world
For the world’s leaders – and diplomats – who are currently watching the 
extraordinary progress of this US election campaign, there is a period of waiting 
to see whether America’s role in the world has changed permanently, or whether 
the last four years will in time come to be seen by historians as a more transient 
disruption to the prevailing international order.
What is clear is that the next president will determine the trajectory of the US’s 
relationship with China. China now accounts for some 16 per cent of the world’s 
GDP, has unparalleled influence on global consumption patterns, and is a major 
influence in leading multilateral institutions.
The contributors to this collection of essays agree that the challenge from China 
is pervasive, and that – for either a Republican or a Democratic administration 
in Washington – the effects of the US–China confrontation will reverberate across 
the globe. For this reason, it is considered across most chapters in this collection, 
rather than treated as a standalone.
But the next US president – be this Trump or Biden – can determine whether to 
reassert America’s ambition to lead, and renew partnerships, in an increasingly 
multipolar world. The critical choice will be whether to reinvest in diplomacy, 
and to make liberal values central to US foreign policymaking.
14 Broadwater, L. (2020), ‘Both Parties Fret as More Democrats Request Mail Ballots in Key States’, New York Times, 
30 September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/mail-voting-democrats-republicans-turnout.html 
(accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
15 Gellman, B. (2020), ‘The Election that Could Break America’, The Atlantic, 23 September 2020, https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/11/what-if-trump-refuses-concede/616424 (accessed 6 Oct. 2020). 
16 Itkowitz, C. (2020), ‘Trump won’t commit to a ‘peaceful transfer of power’ if he loses’, Washington Post, 
24 September 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-transfer-of-power/2020/09/23/
be6954d0-fdf0-11ea-b555-4d71a9254f4b_story.html (accessed 6 Oct. 2020).
The contributors to this collection of essays 
agree that the challenge from China is pervasive, 
and that the effects of the US–China confrontation 
will reverberate across the globe.
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About this paper
The task of the authors of this collection of essays is to consider what is at stake for 
the some of the most pressing international and regional challenges, and how the 
outcome of the 2020 US presidential election will affect these. In some cases, the 
contributors discern a clear distinction between the likely policy trajectory under 
a second Trump term and what might be expected, or possible, under a Biden 
presidency. In other cases, the fundamental drivers suggest differences of style 
rather than radical differences of policy. The US’s international engagement, 
and its standing in the world, was already changing before Trump entered the 
White House, but, in the view of most – if not all – the authors, the policy choices 
made by the next administration will continue to have critical impact globally.
In Chapter 2, Hans Kundnani argues that Europe will come under increasing 
pressure to align its policies towards China with the US, especially if Biden is 
elected in November. This will create difficult choices for Europe. The election may 
also shape who America’s favoured European partners are. A Biden administration 
would be likely try to work more closely with Germany, but the author contends 
that the UK is the more natural partner for the US on China. If Trump remains in 
office over the next four years, the EU will push for greater sovereignty. This will 
be difficult to achieve, in part because Poland and the US are likely to further their 
efforts to deepen a bilateral relationship. France, on the other hand, would press the 
EU to adopt a more coherent set of independent policies. Regardless of who sits in 
the White House, Kundnani is sceptical that greater European sovereignty will follow.
In Chapter 3, Heather Williams examines the security challenge posed by Russian 
adventurism – which for the last four years has gone largely unchecked – for the next 
US administration. In her assessment, the US will need to adopt a finely balanced 
‘two-track’ approach that assures NATO allies of its commitment to mutual security 
and signals to Russia its resolve to deter future aggression, while also pursuing 
arms control and other risk reduction opportunities that promote transparency and 
predictability. She argues that the US should look to rebuild trust among its allies as 
an essential part of its national security strategy, emphasizing that Russian military 
modernization, together with the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, have once again made Europe a potential battleground. Williams sets out the 
priorities and likely policy choices of both a second Trump administration and an 
incoming administration under Biden. For either one, the most pressing task will 
be the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which is set to expire 
in February 2021.
In Chapter 4, Sanam Vakil argues that transatlantic divisions and conflicting 
objectives in critical areas of Middle East policy have brought greater instability 
to the region over the last four years. Focusing on the Persian Gulf region, she 
makes the case that the next administration will need to view Iran and the Arab 
Gulf states not as discrete policy areas, but instead as part of a holistic, long-term 
strategy. The Iran nuclear deal, regional interference by Tehran, its ballistic missile 
programme, and US support for the Arab Gulf states in Yemen and Libya are all 
interlinked, and should be treated as such. Regardless of who occupies the White 
House from next year, the administration will need to draw on the lessons of 
successive policy failures in the region, and understand the importance of building 
US foreign policy priorities
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a broad consensus – domestic, regional and international – on policy coordination. 
As part of this, in order to stabilize the JCPOA following the US formal withdrawal 
in 2018, the US will need to recognize that the E3 – France, Germany and the UK – 
are critical actors whose support and liaison with Iran will be essential to achieving 
a meaningful shift in the current balance of tensions. The author examines the 
prospects for progress under both a Trump and a Biden administration.
In Chapter 5, Marianne Schneider-Petsinger anticipates significant continuity in 
US trade policy, whether under a Trump or a Biden administration. Global trade 
will continue to dominate US foreign economic policy, and the drive to level the 
playing field with China will be maintained. While a Biden administration would 
be expected to work more closely with European partners to develop a joint response 
to China, policy divergence between the US and the EU will continue under either 
administration – for instance over digital services taxes. The challenges for WTO 
reform will remain. Re-entry into the now Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership would be complex, and efforts to strengthen 
supply-chain resilience will focus on domestic production. Trade policy will continue 
to face hurdles in Congress, too, since significant divisions persist within the 
Democratic Party as well as between Republicans and Democrats.
The next two chapters focus on climate change and global health. In both these 
critical areas, President Trump has reversed US engagement in the most important 
multilateral forums. In Chapter 6, Sam Geall and Tim G. Benton focus on the 
setback to efforts on climate change mitigation arising from the signalled US 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, as well as the attacks on climate science 
that have gained a public platform under Trump. They nonetheless identify the 
opportunity that exists for the next US administration to lead global coordination 
on a ‘cleaner’ recovery from the pandemic – to ‘build back better’. In the authors’ 
assessment, the success of any future climate regime will be crucially dependent 
on there being a cooperative relationship between the US and China. Even in the 
context of the wider strategic competition between the two powers, their common 
interest in climate security demands continued engagement, through technical 
exchange, the building of trust, and coordinated efforts. 
In Chapter 7, Amy Pope contrasts the current administration’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic to the US’s long bipartisan history of engagement 
in multilateral cooperation against infectious diseases. She identifies that 
9/11, and the anthrax attacks that followed soon after in 2001, led to urgent 
scrutiny of the US’s vulnerability to extreme shocks, including biological threats 
such as an infectious disease pandemic. Nonetheless, while investment in 
infectious disease response was accelerated under both the Bush and the Obama 
administrations, this cumulative effort was not yet sufficient to enable the US to 
manage an outbreak on the scale of the current pandemic. And now, the response 
of the Trump administration to COVID-19 is unprecedented in its politicization, 
in its marginalization of expertise, and in its antagonism towards China and WHO. 
Pope argues that it is vital for the next administration to significantly increase 
funding for, and political prioritization of, the US domestic and global health 
response to COVID-19. It should recommit, too, to investment in WHO and other 
key multilateral organizations, and help efforts at reform rather than, as Trump has 
tried to do, walk away. Within the US, there needs to be a rigorous investigation, 
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as happened after 9/11, of the response to COVID-19, in an effort to ensure that 
lessons are learned and built on. It is through such a process that the US will better 
prepare for the next outbreak, and – critically – guard against future policy failure. 
In Chapter 8, Christopher Sabatini takes as a starting point the devastation that 
COVID-19 has brought to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
argues that the next US administration might have an essential role to play in 
helping the countries of the region rebuild their economies. A critical step would 
be for the US to lead an international response to the looming public debt crisis. 
He makes the case that the next administration should make efforts to recover the 
tools of US soft power in the region: part of this demands restoring the US’s moral 
authority on matters of corruption, immigration, human rights and multilateral 
cooperation; and working on potential points of partnership such as security and 
climate change adaptation. China’s growing investment and influence in Latin 
America and the Caribbean will continue to be a cause of concern for the next 
administration, but the author contends that this need not be a zero-sum threat. 
Instead, there is scope for the US and China to find areas of cooperation, such as 
investment in infrastructure, climate change and trade.
In the final chapter, Leslie Vinjamuri makes the case that democracy and 
human rights concerns have moved up the agenda in the US–China relationship, 
and that US policy has taken an ideological turn. Despite President Trump’s 
aversion to leading with human rights, there has been growing pressure across his 
administration and in Congress to draw attention to, inter alia, China’s surveillance 
tactics, its repression of the Uighurs in Xinjiang and its restrictions of democratic 
freedoms in Hong Kong. The focus on values is likely to be maintained, but the next 
administration should develop a clear strategy for influencing behaviour and avoid 
a focus on identity or ideology. Ensuring greater consistency on human rights in its 
foreign policymaking will be an important aspect of this. The challenge will be in 
managing important partnerships not only with China, but also with countries like 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and India whose record on democracy and human rights in 
recent years has been poor or regressing. Essential, too, will be the clear commitment 
of the next administration to upholding democratic norms at home. Without this, 





A US foreign policy that is increasingly focused on strategic 
competition with China will – whoever is president – 
subordinate relationships with European allies to this 
overriding priority.
Hans Kundnani
Atlanticists tend to view the 2020 US presidential election as a make-or-break 
moment. They argue that the transatlantic relationship has already been damaged 
by the presidency of Donald Trump, and that a second term might deliver the fatal 
blow not just to the relationship, but to the liberal international order of which it 
is often seen to be a part. A Biden administration, in contrast, would recommit 
to the US’s long-standing alliances and to multilateralism, and work with its allies 
on European security and developing a coordinated transatlantic approach to 
China – increasingly the focus in the relationship between Europe and the US.
This chapter argues that the implications of the 2020 election for the transatlantic 
relationship are not quite as clear-cut as this view suggests. Even before Trump 
was elected as president in 2016, the transatlantic relationship was already in 
a kind of structural crisis. The increasing focus of US foreign policy on China 
and the resultant pressure on resources has for some years intensified discussions 
about burden-sharing: as president, Barack Obama went so far as to describe 
European allies as ‘free riders’.17 As US foreign policy becomes increasingly 
focused on strategic competition with China and subordinates relationships 
with long-standing allies to that overriding priority, Europe will be faced 
with difficult choices – whoever is president.
17 See for example Goldberg, J. (2016), ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525 (accessed 25 Sept. 2020).
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In Europe, meanwhile, Trump’s presidency has put momentum behind the idea 
of ‘European sovereignty’, something that Atlanticists who believe that Europe 
and the US can cooperate on China tend to underestimate.18 Even if Trump is 
re-elected in November, Europeans are unlikely to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’. 
Rather, Europe is likely to be divided, as France and like-minded member states 
seek to develop defence initiatives within the EU, while others such as Poland 
look to further bilateralize their security relationship with the US. But – regardless 
of who is in the White House next year – the notion of ‘European sovereignty’ 
will limit Europe’s willingness to defer to the US on China policy.
The structural crisis of the 
transatlantic relationship
While Trump clearly represents a break in US policy towards Europe, that break 
is not quite as dramatic as might first appear. Atlanticists seem to imagine that until 
Trump became president, the US had been consistently supportive of the European 
project. But while it is true that the impetus for the first steps towards European 
integration came from the US – in this sense it can even be seen as an American 
project – the US has gradually become less unequivocal in its support for what 
became the EU.19 There have also been partisan differences: broadly, Democratic 
presidents have historically been more supportive of the EU than have Republicans.
The tendency among Atlanticists to idealize US policy towards Europe before Trump 
entered the White House obscures the pressures on the transatlantic relationship 
that were already evident prior to his run for the presidency in 2016. In recent 
decades, Europe has come under increasing pressure to take greater responsibility 
for its own security as the US has declined in relative terms and has become more 
and more focused – particularly in response to the rise of China – on what is 
now termed the Indo-Pacific. A consequence of this has been an effort to reduce 
US commitments in parts of the world, such as Europe, that are no longer seen 
as critical to the US, or that are able to maintain security without significant 
US help – what Dan Hamilton has called ‘selective burden shedding’.20
The uncertainty about the US security guarantee towards Europe that followed 
Trump’s election four years ago intensified the ongoing debate about the future of 
NATO, and in particular created momentum in Europe around the French concept 
of ‘strategic autonomy’. In practice, however, collective security in Europe has become 
more bilateralized, as countries like Poland have sought to negotiate separately with 
the US in an effort to win greater commitments for themselves.21 Debates about 
European security were already further complicated by the UK’s decision to leave 
the EU: while the UK remained unconditionally committed to European security, 
it reduced the military resources available for defence integration within the EU.
18 On the idea of ’European sovereignty’, see Kundnani, H. (2020), ‘Europe’s sovereignty dilemma’, Berlin Policy 
Journal, 13 May 2020, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/europes-sovereignty-conundrum (accessed 4 Sept. 2020).
19 See Kundnani, H. (2018), ‘Rethinking European integration’, The American Interest, 9 July 2018, 
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/07/09/rethinking-european-integration (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
20 Conversation with the author.
21 See Kundnani, H. (2017), ‘Donald Trump’s “East Asianisation” of Europe’, Royal United Services Institute, 
26 April 2017, https://rusi.org/commentary/donald-trumps-east-asianisation-europe (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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The China challenge
These issues around burden-sharing will continue regardless of the outcome 
of the presidential election in November – and will be exacerbated by the pressure 
on US resources of dealing with the rise of China. US foreign policy has become 
even more focused on China under President Trump than it was with the Obama 
administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia. Trump has notably adopted a more confrontational 
stance on China than did his predecessor; and has also drawn a line under Obama’s 
China strategy by following through on his 2016 election pledge to withdraw the 
US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a central element of the ‘pivot’. 
Instead, Trump has sought to radically alter the US–China economic relationship 
by taking a more protectionist approach to trade.
In doing so, Trump largely abandoned Washington’s efforts, begun under the 
Obama administration, to work with European allies on Asia policy. Indeed, in 2018 
the Trump administration went so far as to impose tariffs on imports of steel and 
aluminium from the EU as well as from China. After the EU failed to secure an 
exemption from the tariffs, it retaliated with counter-tariffs on US products. It was 
in the context of these escalating tensions over trade, and the imposition of new 
economic sanctions that would penalize European companies that continue 
to do business in Iran, that the concept of ‘European sovereignty’ took hold.
A consensus has now emerged in Washington around the idea of ‘strategic 
competition’ with China. But it is far from clear that there is a transatlantic 
consensus. There has been much discussion of the shift in thinking on China 
in Europe, particularly since the publication of a European Commission paper 
in March 2019 that described China as a ‘systemic rival’22 – leading some analysts 
to speculate that Europe and the US may be moving towards a joint approach. 
But although many Europeans want to pursue a tougher strategy in order to 
‘level the playing field’ on economic issues, few want to see a more comprehensive 
‘decoupling’ from the Chinese economy.23 In fact, German companies like BASF 
and Volkswagen have doubled down on production in China in recent years 
by building new plants in China.
With the exception of France and the UK, which have carried out naval operations 
in the South China Sea, European states do not want to get involved in territorial 
issues in the Asia-Pacific region, which they tend to regard as a struggle for 
primacy between China and the US. Moreover, although Europeans often claim 
that human rights are a ‘European value’, they have also shown a reluctance to 
take a stand on issues such as China’s treatment of Uighurs, on which the US has 
become increasingly vocal. (And at an institutional level, any member state can 
22 European Commission (2019), ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
23 Small, A. (2019), ‘Why Europe is getting tough on China’, Foreign Affairs, 3 April 2019, https://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/china/2019-04-03/why-europe-getting-tough-china; Small, A. (2020), ‘The Meaning 
of Strategic Rivalry’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 13 May 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/ 
summary/the_meaning_of_systemic_rivalry_europe_and_china_beyond_the_pandemic (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
A consensus has now emerged in Washington around 
the idea of ‘strategic competition’ with China.
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block a statement or even a discussion on such matters by the EU.) In fact, many 
EU member states may see attempts to push them into alignment with US policy – 
for example through economic sanctions on Chinese companies that would have 
a secondary impact on European firms – as a violation of ‘European sovereignty’.
A second Trump administration
It is almost as difficult to predict what a second Trump term might look like 
as it was to predict, four years ago, how his first term might unfold. Perhaps 
the biggest questions for Europe will be around the future of NATO, from which 
Trump has threatened to withdraw the US – though opposition in Congress will 
likely prevent him following through on this. If Trump is re-elected in November, 
a second term would certainly give further momentum to the proponents 
of ‘European sovereignty’. It is also possible in this context that Europe – and 
in particular Germany – might increase defence spending to the extent that 
would be necessary for Europe to ‘take its destiny into its own hands’, as German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel (herself due to leave office next year) has previously 
said it should. If this were to happen, it might actually make the transatlantic 
relationship more sustainable in the medium term by finally rebalancing it.
However, it is unlikely that even a second term for Donald Trump would be 
enough to bring about such a dramatic shift in European security policy. Even if 
the logic for ‘strategic autonomy’ becomes more compelling, the huge difficulties 
in achieving it would remain.24 What is more likely is that four more years of the 
Trump administration would result in further division in Europe between those EU 
member states like France that support ‘strategic autonomy’ and those like Poland 
that seek instead to deepen their bilateral security ties with the US (and perhaps 
other security providers like the UK). The withdrawal of US troops from Germany, 
recently announced by the Trump administration, would go ahead – and likely 
be followed by further steps along these lines.25
Beyond the question of European security, there could also be an intensification 
of the conflict between Europe and the US on economic issues. A second Trump 
administration might go further in imposing tariffs on European exports – in 
particular on automobiles, as the president has repeatedly threatened. It would 
also likely increase economic pressure on China, which would indirectly 
affect Europe. In particular, the US might be expected to go further in imposing 
sanctions on Chinese companies, with the potential for a secondary impact on 
European firms. This would cause notable friction with Germany, whose companies 
are resistant to the idea of ‘decoupling’ with China.26
24 See Kundnani, H. (2018), ‘The Necessity and Impossibility of Strategic Autonomy’, German Marshall Fund, 
10 January 2018, https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2018/01/10/necessity-and-impossibility-strategic-autonomy 
(accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
25 Stewart, P. and Ali, I. (2020), ‘U.S. to withdraw about 12,000 troops from Germany but nearly half to stay 
in Europe’, Reuters, 29 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-military/u-s-to- 
withdraw-about-12000-troops-from-germany-but-nearly-half-to-stay-in-europe-idUSKCN24U20L 
(accessed 4 Sept. 2020).
26 On the relationship between China and Germany, see Oertel, J. (2020), ‘Redefining Germany’s Relationship 
with China’, Echo Wall, 12 May 2020, https://www.echo-wall.eu/knowledge-gaps/redefining-germanys- 
relationship-china (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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A Biden presidency
From a European perspective, an administration led by Joe Biden would feel 
very different to a second Trump administration. A Biden administration can 
be expected to publicly embrace the transatlantic relationship, and this would 
be welcomed by many in Europe. It would align much more closely with Europeans 
on a range of issues such as climate change. It would also be much more supportive 
of the EU than Trump has been. Its instinct would be to work closely with Germany, 
which many of Biden’s foreign policy team admire.27 On the other hand, it is likely to 
want to downgrade the relationship with the UK – at least while Boris Johnson, who 
is widely seen by Democrats as a British version of Trump – remains prime minister.28
A Biden administration can be expected to take a tough stance on Putin’s Russia. 
In particular because of Russian interference in the last presidential election, many 
Democrats have become much more hawkish on Russia – a position previously 
associated more with Republicans like Senator John McCain – than they were prior 
to 2016. But while some in Europe, particularly in the Baltic states and Poland, would 
welcome such an approach, others, particularly in southern Europe, would be less 
enthusiastic. Although, as already noted, a Biden administration would likely seek 
closer cooperation with Germany, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline could remain 
a source of tension between Germany and the US as Congress implements further 
sanctions against companies and perhaps even government officials involved 
in the project.29
Although a Biden administration would make a clear commitment to NATO, 
contention around burden-sharing between the US and its European allies would 
continue in a context in which US resources are increasingly focused on China. 
But a Biden administration would likely avoid publicly criticizing European 
NATO members, above all Germany, for their low level of defence spending, 
having seen Trump’s antagonistic line on this to be unproductive. Instead, his 
administration will try to cooperate with Europe on issues such as reform of the 
World Trade Organization, stabilizing the Middle East as the US footprint there 
decreases, and – above all – responding effectively to the China challenge.30
27 For example, Biden’s foreign policy adviser Antony Blinken called Germany ‘our most important ally in 
Europe’. See Amanpour, C. (@camanpour) (2020), tweet, 30 July 2020, https://twitter.com/camanpour/
status/1288906306796032000?s=20 (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
28 For example, in 2019 Biden himself referred to Johnson as a ‘physical and emotional clone’ of President 
Trump. See Frazin, R. (2019), ‘Biden calls Boris Johnson ‘a physical and emotional clone’ of Trump’, The Hill, 
13 December 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/474419-biden-calls-boris-johnson-a-physical- 
and-emotional-clone-of-trump (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
29 See Hackenbroich, J. (2020), ‘How the US could ramp up its economic war with China’, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 8 July 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_the_us_could_ramp_up_ 
its_economic_war_on_china (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
30 See Wright, T. (2020), ‘The quiet reformation of Biden’s foreign policy’, Brookings Institution, 20 March 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/20/the-quiet-reformation-of-bidens-foreign-
policy; Carpenter, M. (2020), ‘Five ways to fix America’s broken ties with Europe’, Politico, 4 August 2020, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/5-ways-to-fix-americas-broken-ties-with-europe (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
A Biden administration can be expected to publicly 
embrace the transatlantic relationship, and this 
would be welcomed by many in Europe.
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However, efforts by the Biden administration to forge a transatlantic approach 
to China would take place in a different context than that seen under the Obama 
presidency. Democrats such as Kurt Campbell (who led attempts to develop a joint 
approach on China under the Obama administration) and Jake Sullivan have 
embraced the idea of ‘strategic competition’, but few Europeans will want to enter 
this competition on the US side.31 There may be some scope for cooperation on 
issues like the screening of investments by Chinese companies and controls on the 
export of sensitive technologies to China. But unlike the US, which is increasingly 
subordinating economic policy questions to the logic of strategic competition, 
European states can be expected to continue to view their dealings with China 
more through an economic lens.
Like a second Trump administration, a Biden administration could also impose 
sanctions on China that would have a secondary impact on European companies. 
Sanctions in response to human rights violations, which a Biden administration 
is likely to emphasize even more than the Trump administration has thus far, may 
present particular difficulties for European countries because of the exposure of 
their companies to the Chinese market. This might lead to particular friction with 
Germany. Meanwhile the UK, which in recent months has adopted an increasingly 
hawkish stance on China, may turn out to be one of the few European countries 
that is substantially aligned with the US on China.32 In other words, despite its 
instincts to work closely with Germany, a Biden administration might find that 
the UK is a more helpful partner in achieving its objectives with regard to China – 
and perhaps other areas too.
31 Campbell, K. and Sullivan, J. (2019), ‘Competition Without Catastrophe’, Foreign Affairs, September/
October 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe 
(accessed 17 Aug. 2020).








A ‘two-track’ approach is required to rein in Russia’s 
adventurism and reassure allies in Europe, balancing 
a strong deterrent with arms control and other 
risk-reduction opportunities.
Heather Williams
In February 2020 the US intelligence community warned Congress that Russia 
appeared poised to interfere in the upcoming US presidential election, as it 
had done in 2016.33 Election interference is just one of the significant national 
security challenges that Russia will pose to whoever is in the White House next 
year, along with adventurism in Europe and Moscow’s efforts to drive a wedge 
between Washington and its allies.
Under the Trump administration, the US has been inconsistent in addressing these 
issues, oscillating between a strong deterrent in its defence postures and conciliatory 
messages from the White House. Balancing competition and cooperation with 
Russia is a perennial national security conundrum, but in recent months numerous 
foreign policy experts have called for just such an approach. For example, former 
Obama administration official Angela Stent has captured the challenge for the US 
in addressing Russian adventurism as being ‘to find an acceptable balance between 
cooperation and competition and to compartmentalize the relationship in a more 
33 Goldman, A., Barnes, J., Haberman, M. and Fandos, N. (2020), ‘Lawmakers are Warned that Russia is 
Meddling to Re-elect Trump, New York Times, 20 February 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/ 
us/politics/russian-interference-trump-democrats.html (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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effective way than at present’.34 And former NATO deputy secretary general Rose 
Gottemoeller has recalled the 1967 Harmel Report, which informed the Alliance’s 
forging of a balance of deterrence and detente in subsequent decades.35
For the US today, and for its next president, what do these two tracks – cooperation 
and competition – look like in practice? This chapter makes three arguments with 
regard to Russia, national security, and the US’s credibility with its allies:
 — Russian adventurism has gone largely unchecked for the past four years, 
to include interference in the 2016 presidential election, support for the Assad 
regime in Syria, and bounties to the Taliban for killing US troops. Inconsistency 
in implementation of US policy has further emboldened Moscow.
 — Reining in such adventurism will require a finely balanced ‘two-track’ approach. 
On the one hand, the US must maintain a strong deterrent and restore credibility 
with its allies. At the same time, it must pursue arms control and other risk 
reduction opportunities.
 — European security and the US’s role as a global leader hang in the balance. 
Russian military modernization and the demise of the INF Treaty literally make 
Europe a potential battleground. The US’s assurances to its allies lie at the core 
of its global leadership, but have been waning in recent years. Trust in the 
US among other NATO members has plummeted: according to Gallup polling, 
European disapproval of US leadership reached a record high of 61 per cent in 
2019.36 From the outset, therefore, whichever administration is in the White 
House from 2021 should look to the rebuilding of trust among its allies as 
an essential part of its national security strategy.
US leadership on the line
America’s national security and credibility are critically at stake, particularly 
in the eyes of its European allies. Among the defining features of the present 
administration have been its inconsistent policy towards Putin’s Russia, and its 
often contradictory messages on the US’s commitment to the NATO Alliance.
President Trump has been at odds with key parts of his administration from the 
outset, particularly the Department of Defense with regard to allies. The 2017 
National Security Strategy, for example, states: ‘Today, actors such as Russia are 
using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies.’37 
Similarly, in his preface to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the then Secretary 
34 Stent, A. (2020), ‘Why are US-Russia relations so challenging?’, Brookings Institution, 27 April 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/why-are-us-russia-relations-so-challenging (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
35 Gottemoeller, R. (2019), ‘NATO Is Not Brain Dead’, Foreign Affairs, 19 December 2019, https://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-19/nato-not-brain-dead (accessed 17 Aug. 2020). For background 
on the Harmel Report, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2017), ‘Harmel Report’, https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_67927.htm (accessed 25 Sept. 2020).
36 Ray, J. (2020), ‘U.S. Leadership Remains Unpopular Worldwide’, Gallup, 27 July 2020, https://news.gallup.com/
poll/316133/leadership-remains-unpopular-worldwide.aspx (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
37 White House (2019), ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, December 2017, p. 14, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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of Defense, James Mattis, highlighted: ‘Russia is modernizing these [nuclear] 
weapons as well as its other strategic systems. Even more troubling has been Russia’s 
adoption of military strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for 
their success.’38
In contrast, Trump has typically sided with his Russian counterpart over the US 
intelligence community and America’s European allies. He trusted Vladimir Putin’s 
assurances that Russia did not interfere in the 2016 election, and the administration 
failed to respond to intelligence that Russia was offering bounties to the Taliban for 
killing US soldiers in Afghanistan.39 Trump has consistently expressed scepticism 
about the value of NATO, and, as reported by the New York Times in 2019, allegedly 
contemplated US withdrawal from the alliance in private discussions the previous 
year.40 For his part, in his January 2018 speech on national defence strategy, former 
Defense Secretary Mattis stated: ‘History proves that nations with allies thrive, an 
approach to security and prosperity that has served the United States well in keeping 
peace and winning war.’41 The problem, therefore, has not necessarily been US 
strategy towards Russia, but rather its implementation.
One area where the administration has been consistent, however, is in its rejection 
of existing arms control agreements. In February 2019, announcing that the US 
would begin the process of withdrawal – effective six months later – from the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Trump pointed to years of alleged 
Russian violation that pose ‘a direct threat to our allies and troops abroad’.42 
In 2018 Trump formally declared that the US would withdraw from the 2015 Iran 
nuclear deal – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – which he had repudiated 
from the outset; and in June 2020 the administration gave notice of its intention 
to withdraw the US from the Open Skies Treaty, citing Russian non-compliance. 
The US’s leadership both as a security guarantor and in arms control is imperilled 
by such actions.43
38 US Department of Defense (2018), ‘U.S. Nuclear Posture Review’, February 2018, p. I, https://dod.defense.
gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
39 Savage, C., Schmitt, E., and Schwirtz, M. (2020), ‘Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S. 
Troops, Intelligence Says’, New York Times, 26 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/26/us/politics/
russia-afghanistan-bounties.html (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
40 Barnes, J. and Cooper, H. (2019), ‘Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns 
Over Russia’, New York Times, 14 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-
president-trump.html (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
41 US Department of Defense (2018), ‘Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy’, 
19 January 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1420042/remarks- 
by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
42 White House (2019), ‘Statement from the President Regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty’, 1 February 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-
intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
43 Harvard Belfer Center (2018), ‘Assessing the Iran deal pullout’, Harvard Gazette, 8 May 2018, 
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/05/harvard-analysts-assess-the-iran-deal-pullout 
(accessed 7 Sept. 2020).
Trump has typically sided with his Russian 
counterpart over the US intelligence community 
and America’s European allies.
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How the next administration manages these challenges will have major implications 
for Europe. It may either strengthen the credibility of the US with its allies, and 
check Russian adventurism in the European theatre; or it may further damage 
the transatlantic relationship and sow greater instability in Europe, particularly 
for allies in the east such as Poland and the Baltic states. A particularly critical 
area of vulnerability is NATO (dis)unity. Part of Russia’s strategy is to drive a wedge 
between the US and its European allies and within Europe itself. Whether or not 
the next administration reasserts US leadership and checks Russian ambitions could 
determine the future of the NATO Alliance and the collective security architecture 
that has defined Europe since the end of the Second World War.
Balancing deterrence and detente: 
challenges for the next administration
For the next administration, forging a bolder response vis-à-vis Russia and 
strengthening US credibility among its allies will require a balance of competition 
and cooperation, deterrence and detente. It requires partnership and trust, but 
within limits.44 As recently recalled by Rose Gottemoeller, the 1967 Harmel Report 
captured this inter-relationship of deterrence and detente. The balance was later 
manifested in the ‘dual track’ approach of the 1980s. On the one hand, the US 
must do more to assure European allies of its commitment to mutual security, 
and signal to Russia its resolve to deter future aggression – be that in the form of 
‘grey zone’ activities, information operations or new missile deployments in the 
European theatre. On the other hand, arms control and efforts at cooperation can 
also strengthen security by promoting transparency and predictability in US–Russia 
strategic relations, and reassure allies that Washington will not recklessly escalate 
into a conflict with Moscow.
Turning first to the challenges of competition and deterrence, the US is faced 
with an emboldened Russia. A consistent theme among many Russia scholars in the 
West is that Moscow has a weak hand, but has played it extremely well.45 Russia’s 
current strategy is one of opportunism: it is seeking to deepen and take advantage 
of fissures within Europe while also making use of the leadership vacuum left 
by the US. Meddling in elections is just one of many tactics available to Russia. 
Its new deterrence strategy, released in June 2020, suggests that it will continue 
on its current trajectory of military modernization, but also notes that ‘compliance 
with international arms control obligations’ is one of the principles of its approach 
to nuclear deterrence.46
44 See for example Stent, A. (2015), The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
45 See for example Kofman, M. (2017), ‘The Moscow School of Hard Knocks: Key Pillars of Russian Strategy’, War 
on the Rocks, 21 November 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-moscow-school-of-hard-knocks-key-
pillars-of-russian-strategy; and Nuland, V. (2020), ‘Pinning down Putin: How a Confident America Should Deal with 
Russia, Foreign Affairs, 9 June 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2020-06-09/
pinning-down-putin (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
46 Weitz, R. (2020), ‘The Message in Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Don’t Mess With Us, But Let’s Talk’, 
Business Insider, 5 July 2020, https://www.hudson.org/research/16199-the-message-in-russia-s-new-nuclear-
weapons-strategy-don-t-mess-with-us-but-let-s-talk (accessed 17 Aug. 2020). See also CNA Russian Studies 
Program (2020), ‘Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence: 
Informal translation by the CNA Russia Studies Program’.
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The most immediately pressing issue for the next administration will be the 
extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is 
set to expire on 5 February 2021, 10 years after its entry into effect. NATO allies 
overwhelmingly support its extension.47 According to the treaty’s chief negotiators, 
Anatoly Antonov and Rose Gottemoeller, failure to extend the agreement ‘could 
bring a return to nuclear competition and spark mutual suspicion that would 
push the world to a level of nuclear risk unseen for decades’.48 As of early October 
2020, it remains unclear if New START will indeed be extended. The current US 
administration is engaging in talks with Russia to discuss extension, and while 
it initially set unlikely conditions, namely extending the terms of the treaty to 
include China,49 Trump indicated in July that negotiations might now move ahead 
with Russia alone: ‘We thought that we would do it [bilateral arms control with 
Russia] first.’50 Otherwise, there is little ‘vision or imagination’ for further arms 
control agreements, according to Open Skies negotiator Bonnie Jenkins.51 When 
it comes to arms control and the breakdown of the INF Treaty, Europe is literally 
caught in the middle. European governments overwhelmingly support continued 
US–Russia arms control, such as the extension of New START.
A second Trump term: end mixed messages
President Trump has given no indication that he would change policy towards Russia 
in a second term. We should not expect a staunch response should there be evidence 
of any Russian meddling in the 2020 election, or much reassurance of allies as to 
his commitment to mutual security. But Trump has indicated at least two possible 
policy shifts with regard to Russia under a second administration.
First, he could either increase or decrease pressure on NATO allies, potentially 
creating further opportunities for Russia. This might mean continued insistence 
that European allies spend more on defence, but this emphasis on burden-sharing 
has produced only limited results so far, and may not have the desired effect.52 
At its most extreme, Trump could attempt to withdraw the US from NATO. Given 
that Congress is overwhelmingly supportive of the Alliance,53 such a move would 
47 See for example Reif, K. and Bugos, S. (2019), ‘Putin Puts Ball in Trump’s Court on New START Extension’, 
Arms Control Association, 20 December 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-12-19/us-russian-
nuclear-arms-control (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
48 Antonov, A. and Gottemoeller, R. (2020), ‘Keeping Peace in the Nuclear Age: Why Washington and Moscow 
Must Extend the New START Treaty’, Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-states/2020-04-29/keeping-peace-nuclear-age (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
49 Pifer, S. (2020), ‘Unattainable conditions for New START extension?’, Brookings Institution, 1 July 2020, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/01/unattainable-conditions-for-new-start-
extension (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
50 White House (2020), ‘Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure’, 29 July 2020, 
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(accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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16 June 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/06/16/a-farewell-to-the-open-skies-
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52 Rapp-Hooper, M. (2020), ‘Saving America’s Alliances’, Foreign Affairs, 10 February 2020, https://www.foreign 
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likely meet with significant domestic opposition and may well prove impossible 
to follow through on, as Congress is considering the bipartisan ‘No NATO 
Withdrawal Act’.54
Second, the administration could take a new approach to arms control. Trump has 
long had the ambition to be an arms control negotiator,55 as indicated by his now-
stalled series of summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. To pursue trilateral 
arms control, his administration might involve China in informal nuclear dialogues 
or technical arms control verification activities, without the pressure of concluding 
an arms control treaty. If a second Trump administration takes the same position 
as the first, whereby it will only engage in arms control with Russia if the process 
also includes China, then the opportunities to move forward will be limited.
To strengthen US national security and develop a two-track approach to Russia, 
therefore, a second Trump administration could focus on consistency in messaging. 
As difficult as this may seem, given Trump’s leadership style, a new national 
security strategy could emphasize a renewed commitment to the US’s allies as 
an important deterrence signal to Russia, and also provide a vision for the future 
of arms control with personal involvement by the president. Above all, however, 
other political actors, notably Congress, would have to assume greater responsibility 
for investigating any evidence of Russian intervention in the 2020 election.
But for Europe, this approach would bring only partial reassurance. Trump 
has already proved to the US’s allies that he does not necessarily follow his own 
administration’s policies; so while new national security strategy documents might 
in theory improve credibility, in practice Trump has shown during his first term that 
adherence to strategy is not a given. NATO allies would understandably be deeply 
concerned about a US withdrawal from the Alliance, and failure to further address 
Russian adventurism would leave many members – particularly in Eastern Europe – 
deeply worried. Moreover, inability or unwillingness to demonstrate substantive 
progress in arms control would leave many countries and institutions troubled about 
rising nuclear risks and the collapse of the rules-based international order. In short, 
a second Trump term would potentially put European security and NATO unity at risk.
54 See for example Borger, J. (2019), ‘Senate committee passes bipartisan bill to stop Trump withdrawing from 
Nato’, Guardian, 11 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/11/senate-committee-
passes-bipartisan-bill-stop-trump-withdrawing-nato (accessed 7 Sept. 2020).
55 See for example Michaels, J. and Williams, H. (2017), ‘The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, 38(1), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1291206 (accessed 17 Aug. 2020).
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A Biden administration: go big to restore  
US leadership
A Biden administration would bring major shifts in the US’s policy towards Russia, 
as part of what one journalist has summed up as an ‘Erase Trump’ doctrine.56 
Biden’s national security strategy would be driven by a quest to restore US global 
leadership. As Colin Kahl, who served as Biden’s national security adviser when he 
was vice-president, puts it: ‘At the top of the agenda at the outset will be signaling 
to our closest democratic allies that we’re back, that alliances and partnerships 
matter.’ 57 A Biden administration might focus on two key areas: restoring arms 
control, and strengthening NATO.
Biden has already stated that he would pursue a New START extension and 
follow-on agreements.58 The New START extension might entail an agreed single 
five-year extension, as permitted under the treaty, or a year-by-year extension 
to review the agreement’s implementation. A Biden administration should also 
set out an ambitious vision for the future of arms control that includes short-term 
initiatives – such as agreements on Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons – 
and longer-term endeavours – such as involving China and addressing threats 
from emerging technologies. This approach would likely be met with significant 
opposition on multiple fronts. Russia might be expected to exact a heavy price 
in exchange for agreeing to curbs on its short- and intermediate-range weapons, 
such as limits on US missile defence. And given Russia’s poor compliance record, 
Congress might oppose any follow-on agreements. 
A second initiative would be to strengthen NATO unity. Biden has referred to 
NATO as ‘the single most consequential alliance in the history of the United States’, 
and supports additional forward-deployed troops in Eastern Europe to deter Russia.59 
But the next administration will also have to make NATO more ‘nimble’, and prioritize 
responding to Russian adventurism.60 This could be met with opposition by some 
NATO members who do not want to antagonize Moscow, but after years of mixed 
messages from Washington, it would likely be a welcome overture.
This vision for a Biden administration would strengthen European security 
and NATO unity. There would, however, potentially be residual distrust of the 
US, based on lessons learned from the Trump era – particularly that changes in 
administration can lead to major swings in policy and attitudes towards Europe, 
albeit this is not an entirely new phenomenon.
56 Nichols, H. (2020), ‘Biden’s doctrine: Erase Trump, re-embrace the world’, Axios, 12 July 2020, 
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What to do on day one?
On the first day of Trump’s second term or of a Biden presidency, the new 
administration should set about defining a new national security strategy. 
This strategy will need to balance a strong deterrent message with a willingness 
to engage in cooperative efforts such as arms control. Restoring credibility with 
allies should also be at the core of this strategy, and Biden’s first foreign visit, 
if he were to win, should be to Brussels to underscore this message.
A longer-term vision for managing Russian adventurism and strengthening 
European security will require continuing to balance competition and cooperation. 
Russian adventurism may be impacted by internal issues, such as demographics 
or a stagnating economy, as much as (if not more so) by America’s response. 
European ambitions are woven throughout Russia’s history and its approach 
to national security: we should not expect that to suddenly change. Renewed 
US leadership and a stronger NATO could, however, change how Russia pursues 
these ambitions. Current strategies of election meddling and adventurism could be 
replaced by more productive means of engagement, such as economic cooperation, 
if the Alliance can strike the right balance. To be sure, however, they could also 
be replaced by more aggressive means of engagement. The stakes for Putin’s 
Russia are also high.
European security has always had links to US politics, and that is particularly 
true in the upcoming election. A second Trump term could leave Europe even 
more vulnerable to Russian information operations and strategic threats, and 
deeply confused about the US’s long-standing commitments to mutual security. 
A Biden administration would face the enormous task – indeed, the scale of this 
should not be underestimated – of restoring American credibility and leadership 
with frustrated allies. The solution lies neither in ruthless competition with 
Russia nor in conciliation, but rather in a finely calibrated and familiar two-track 




process for the 
Middle East
A viable long-term strategy for Iran and the Arab Gulf 
states is critically dependent on the US administration 
securing regional and international buy-in, and 
bipartisan support in Congress.
Sanam Vakil
The outcome of the 2020 US presidential election will have significant implications 
for the direction of US, UK and EU policy in the Middle East. Over the past four 
years, transatlantic divisions and conflicting objectives in critical Middle East 
policy areas have brought greater instability to the region. President Trump’s 
formal announcement, in May 2018, that he would withdraw the US from the Iran 
nuclear agreement – the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached 
in 2015 under the Obama administration – and his administration’s imposition of 
a sanctions-based campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ against Tehran, have exacerbated 
regional tensions and brought about the acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Through his calls for increased burden-sharing and the drawdown of US troops, 
grandstanding on a new Israel–Palestine peace deal, and inconsistent response 
to Iranian provocation in the Persian Gulf, Trump has stoked anxiety and confused 
the US’s long-time partners in the region.
Without effective and collaborative US engagement on Middle East policy, relations 
with Europe have become strained, and this has limited both sides’ effectiveness 
in promoting stability across the region. Wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya continue 
unabated. Tehran’s support for non-state actors remains a destabilizing influence; 
and the rift in the GCC and now three-year blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt is unresolved. Russia, China and Turkey have taken 
stronger economic and security positions in the Middle East, complicating regional 
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dynamics and adding a layer of geopolitical competition to the fragile interlay 
of regional and international challenges. Added to these factors, and playing out 
in advance of the US presidential election, are the impact of, and economic fallout 
from, the COVID-19 pandemic, and heightened US–China tensions, all of which 
are contributing to even greater regional insecurity.
US policy towards the Middle East under the Trump administration has, 
notwithstanding the rhetoric of the last four years, yet to bring Iran to the 
negotiating table. Nor has it delivered the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), 
or the promised ‘deal of the century’ between Israel and the Palestinians. The signing 
of US-brokered agreements to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE 
and Bahrain, in September 2020,61 is a positive step forward, but any meaningful 
realignments will be contingent on mutual commitment to a longer-term process.
Managing relations with countries on both sides of the Persian Gulf will remain 
a principal foreign policy challenge for either a second Trump administration 
or a new administration under a Biden presidency. Rather than treating Iran 
and the Arab Gulf states as separate policy areas, the next administration would 
be better advised to regard the JCPOA, Tehran’s regional interference, its ballistic 
missile programme, the lack of a regional security architecture, and US support 
for the Arab Gulf states in Yemen and Libya as all interlinked. Attempting to deal 
with all these aspects of a wide Middle East policy without a holistic, long-term 
strategy, involving multilateral collaboration, will see the further disintegration 
of the region. For such a strategy to take shape, a domestic consensus within the 
US political establishment is urgently needed. Working multilaterally with the 
EU and the UK would help to advance US objectives, and could simultaneously 
further progress on mutual security concerns in the region, including promoting 
peace and stability, nuclear non-proliferation, counterterrorism, energy and 
maritime security, and stemming refugee flows. An integrated approach would also 
contribute to managing the growth of Russian and Chinese influence in the region.
The US, Iran and the Arab Gulf: the Obama record
What President Trump has in common with his predecessor is that each has 
made efforts – as part of a larger US strategy focused on managing geopolitical 
competition – to resolve regional challenges and redress US security dynamics 
across the Middle East. Under the Obama administration, the calculation was 
that drawing down US resources in the Middle East would allow it to prioritize 
geopolitical challenges in Asia. As part of this strategy, the Obama administration 
devoted its attention to steering through multilateral negotiations to constrain 
Iran’s nuclear programme. Linked to this was Obama’s ambition to create a greater 
balance between Iran and the Arab Gulf. Interviewed for The Atlantic in 2016, 
he stated: ‘The competition between the Saudis and the Iranians … requires 
us to say to our friends as well as to the Iranians that they need to find an effective 
way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.’ 62
61 U.S. Department of State (2020), ‘The Abraham Accords’, https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords 
(accessed 29 Sept. 2020).
62 Goldberg, J. (2016), ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525 (accessed 15 Sept. 2020).
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The JCPOA, concluded in 2015 by Iran, the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), plus Germany 
and the EU, provided for restraints on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for 
sanctions relief. The agreement, hailed by its proponents as a significant multilateral 
achievement, was strongly opposed by Republicans in the US Congress, by the Arab 
Gulf countries and by Israel. Opponents of the deal saw its specific focus on Iran’s 
nuclear programme, and the concessions on sanctions, as an approach that would 
serve to encourage Iran’s interference in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and allow 
the further development of its ballistic missile programme.
Arab states regarded the spread of Iran’s external influence – which grew in Iraq 
following the US-led intervention against the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, 
and subsequently through its military intervention in the Syrian civil war and 
the fight against ISIS in Iraq in 2014 – as clear evidence of its role in driving 
sectarianization across the region. The course of the 2011 Arab uprisings had 
meanwhile also caused alarm among Arab Gulf leaders. When the Obama 
administration did not actively defend Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, a long-time US ally, 
the Gulf monarchies concluded, with great concern, that they could no longer rely 
on Washington as a consistent partner.63 This perception was reinforced with the 
outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, and particularly when President Obama 
did not act on his stated commitment to enforce his ‘red line’ on the Assad regime’s 
use of chemical weapons against civilians.64 Russia’s entry into the Syrian civil 
war in 2015, unchecked by the US, was regarded among the GCC states as further 
evidence that the US was no longer willing to protect Arab Gulf security interests. 
One outcome of this assessment was a growing trend of regional adventurism on the 
part of Arab Gulf states, as seen in the 2011 intervention in defence of the Bahraini 
monarchy, in the Yemen war from 2015, in the 2017 Qatar blockade, and in the 
civil war in Libya. (It is important to note, however, that such interventions have 
not been collectively supported by the GCC, but led more proactively by the UAE 
and Saudi Arabia.)
Despite the Obama administration’s commitment to the multilateral effort 
that achieved the Iran nuclear deal, it ultimately failed to assemble a coalition 
of supporters of the deal both across the Middle East and at home. Congressional 
backing for the JCPOA was clearly impacted by the strong opposition to the deal 
of key US allies in the region, including Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although 
the agreement was eventually approved through a compromise arrangement, 
Republican hostility to the deal was a central theme in US election campaigning 
in 2016, including as part of Donald Trump’s presidential bid.65 Those Arab states 
that had opposed Obama’s Iran strategy now embraced the Trump campaign, 
and the eventual policy of maximum pressure adopted by his administration 
against Tehran.
63 Gerges, F. (2013), ‘The Obama Approach to the Middle East: The End of America’s Moment?’, International 
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The US, Iran and the Arab Gulf: 
the Trump approach
Trump’s campaign threat to withdraw the US from the JCPOA took formal shape 
in May 2018. The stated aim of his administration’s Iran policy was to roll back 
Tehran’s regional influence. It also sought to compel Iran, through maximum 
economic pressure, to return to negotiate a new, comprehensive deal. Such 
a deal would not only increase the scope and scale of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear 
programme; it would also require concessions and impose export controls on its 
ballistic missile programme, and stem its support across the region for Hezbollah 
in Lebanon, the Assad regime in Syria, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia 
groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen.
The US’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and reversion to a sanctions-based 
strategy was unanimously rejected by the other parties to the agreement. In the US, 
too, the Democrats – who regarded the deal as a significant nuclear non-proliferation 
achievement – denounced the Trump administration’s actions. Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Israel, along with many congressional Republicans, supported Trump’s action.66 
France, Germany and the UK (collectively termed the E3), having failed to dissuade 
Trump from going ahead with the withdrawal, now consistently warned of the 
risks of instability while promising to shepherd new negotiations with Tehran.67 
The ramping up of US sanctions forced the withdrawal of most international 
business from the Iranian economy, and effectively blocked Tehran’s access to the 
international banking system. The Trump administration, surprised by the level of 
international compliance with the sanctions, viewed maximum pressure via punitive 
economic constraints as effective in promoting US foreign policy objectives.68
From May 2019, having extracted no concessions from Tehran, Washington imposed 
additional penalties against Iran. These aimed first at cutting off oil exports; and, 
subsequently, sanctioned almost all Iranian trade and industry; designated the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a foreign terrorist organization; and 
also directly targeted Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and foreign minister, 
Mohammad Javad Zarif (who had been instrumental in negotiating the JCPOA), 
among other senior figures. In retaliation, Iran shifted away from JCPOA compliance 
66 Kalin, S. and Dadouch, S. (2018), ‘Gulf Arab allies hail triumph after U.S. quits Iran deal’, Reuters, 8 May 2018, 
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67 Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2019), ‘Press release: E3 Statement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, 
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towards its own ‘maximum resistance’ strategy, designed to increase leverage and 
force a policy shift in Washington. Notably, Tehran made efforts to transfer the costs 
of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure to the wider region, as seen in an 
increase in missile attacks via its proxy groups in Iraq and Yemen, in alleged attacks 
on tankers in the Persian Gulf, and in the missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities 
in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019. Tensions were further raised, in June, 
by the shooting down of a US drone by Iranian forces over the Strait of Hormuz, 
with each side disputing the circumstances of the incident. Escalation also increased 
on the nuclear front: having consistently been verified by the IAEA as being 
in compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, from May 2019 Tehran announced 
a series of incremental breaches of the deal.69
In the period following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, the international 
community, including many of the US’s Middle East partners, directly and indirectly 
lobbied Washington for a shift in strategy. However, diplomatic efforts led by France 
failed to bring Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, together at 
the UN General Assembly in September 2019.70 Tellingly meanwhile, the UAE 
undertook a discreet bilateral de-escalation with Tehran.71 There was a significant 
ramping up of tensions following a rocket attack by Iraqi militias on a military base 
near Kirkuk, in December, in which an American civilian contractor was killed and 
several US service personnel were injured. In January 2020 the head of the IRGC 
Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, was targeted and killed in a US drone strike 
near Baghdad Airport. Iran countered with ballistic missile attacks against US assets 
at airbases in Iraq.72 That no casualties were immediately reported as a result 
of the retaliation gave rise to speculation that temporary mutual deterrence had 
been established in advance of the attacks, implying that both sides were willing 
to ‘draw a line’ and avoid further escalation at this point.73
Rather than alter the course of its maximum pressure strategy, the Trump 
administration has doubled down on sanctions since 2018. In the meantime, 
Washington has been seen not to adequately defend Arab Gulf security interests; 
nor has it sought E3 support for a new multilateral approach to addressing 
regional tensions.74 Indeed – notwithstanding Brexit dynamics, and doubtless 
with an eye on a possible change of administration in the US after 202075 – the 
E3 has remained united in its commitment to shielding the JCPOA from further 
69 Katzman, K. (2020), ‘US-Iran Conflict and Implications for US Policy’, Congressional Research Service, pp. 2–8, 
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70 Wright, R. (2019), ‘Trump’s Close Call Diplomacy with Iran’s President’, New Yorker, 30 September 2019, 
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damage. At the UN, France, Germany and the UK have resisted US pressure tactics 
on the extension of the Iran arms embargo, due to expire in October 2020,76 or to 
accept the reimposition of snapback sanctions.77 The E3 remains deeply concerned 
about these issues, and about Iran’s regional interference, but has pursued its own 
regional track, including a maritime security initiative for the Persian Gulf, in an 
effort to carve out space for regional discussions.
Steps to a multilateral future
The US – whether under a second Trump administration or a new one under 
a Biden presidency – would be well advised to heed the lessons of these continued 
regional policy failures. Foremost among these is the importance of reaching 
both domestic and international consensus around any future regional policy 
coordination. US policymakers will have to recognize that France, Germany and 
the UK are critical actors whose support will be essential to achieving a meaningful 
shift in the current balance of tensions. Drawing on the E3 as interlocutors with 
Iran in order to stabilize the JCPOA must be a priority. Because the E3 countries 
are perceived as more balanced actors in the region, their involvement would help 
create assurances for all sides in a regional security dialogue.
The recent trajectory of US Middle East policy under both Republican and 
Democratic administrations suggests that a regional drawdown will remain the goal 
whoever is in the White House over the next four years. The EU and the UK would 
be wise to look beyond the outcome of November’s election, and to create their 
own joint roadmap for this process and prioritize their own security interests, 
rather than relying on the US to take the lead. Maintaining E3 unity in defending 
the JCPOA and sharing concerns over regional security serves as a good model 
for the bloc’s future. Moreover, a post-Brexit UK that is truly committed to a role 
as ‘Global Britain’ can serve as a critical bridge between Europe and the US. All the 
same, it is hard to see the E3 as being effective without the support and participation 
of the US. The bloc, despite its efforts to protect the JCPOA, has been repeatedly 
pressed by Tehran and Washington to do more.
Should President Trump win a second term, his administration would benefit from 
objective reflection on the limits and challenges of maximum pressure. Not only 
has Iran not returned to the negotiating table, but despite the further constraints 
on its resources Tehran continues to support a wide array of regional militias and 
proxy groups: its deep commitment to its regional interests remains unchanged. 
Testifying before the Senate in July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
acknowledged that while sanctions against Iran ‘have clearly had an impact’, 
in terms of diminishing its capacity to finance Hezbollah and Shia militias in Iraq, 
they have not ‘achieved the ultimate objective, which is to change the behavior 
of the Iranian regime’.78 This recognition could provide the administration with 
76 Manson, K. (2020), ‘US appeals for European support to extend Iran arms embargo’, Financial Times, 13 August 
2020, https://www.ft.com/content/b87fe52b-8e46-437b-a158-357ffa85b7a2 (accessed 28 Sept. 2020).
77 Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2020), ‘Speech: E3 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the JCPoA’, 20 August 2020, 
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an opportunity to reassess its unilateral sanctions-based approach, especially 
if Trump’s offer of a deal with Iran remains on the table.
If the current policy trajectory is maintained under a second Trump administration, 
this will mean the US exerting more of the same pressure vis-à-vis Iran. There is an 
alternative scenario, in which the Trump administration attempts to rebuild trust with 
the E3, and through them engage in renewed nuclear negotiations with Tehran. Four 
years of transatlantic tensions will not be easily brushed aside, however; and the E3 will 
demand safeguards to protect the JCPOA. Washington would need to provide some 
sanctions relief for Iran to return to the negotiating table. Tehran is most certainly going 
to seek compensation for the economic impact of the US withdrawal, and in this respect 
all sides should consider what face-saving incentives could be offered to ease tensions 
and build trust. Arab Gulf states, for their part, could be expected to welcome renewed 
negotiations if they too were consulted through the process this time. Notably, too, 
Trump would likely have greater ease in obtaining congressional approval for a new 
deal with Iran. But Iran’s Supreme Leader has repeatedly affirmed that Tehran will not 
negotiate with Trump, and the hardening domestic climate in Iran, and the probable 
election of a conservative president there in 2021, make it unlikely that the Trump 
administration could shepherd through wider negotiations on regional issues. At best, 
then, through a shift in strategy a second Trump administration could stem the tide 
of a nuclear crisis. It is unlikely to achieve the president’s sweeping aim of meeting the 
Iranian leadership ‘anytime they want to’.79
In contrast, a Biden administration may be tempted to immediately return to the 
JCPOA – not simply to reverse Trump’s Iran policy, but also to halt Tehran’s nuclear 
advancements. Tehran and the E3 would no doubt back renewed US engagement. 
However, any attempt to re-enter the JCPOA without first building congressional 
support would likely be counterproductive and lead to repeated partisan policy 
swings. The approval of Israel and the Arab states, however difficult to achieve, 
would also be necessary to a sustainable outcome: their participation in the process 
would help build confidence. To get their buy-in, therefore, a Biden administration 
would be advised to move beyond the immediate nuclear focus and instead lay out 
a detailed roadmap for a regional security process that would seek to lessen Iran’s 
regional interference and manage Arab Gulf security concerns.80 An inevitable 
part of this discussion would also be acknowledgment of Iran’s threat perceptions, 
alongside resolution of the rift between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Here, a Biden presidency would have a unique opportunity to use the US’s return 
to the JCPOA as leverage for wider negotiations with Iran and the region. To do 
so effectively, his administration would need to think holistically about Iran and 
Arab Gulf security challenges. In close coordination with the E3, the US should 
develop a multilateral process that can, over time, through confidence-building 
measures and international oversight, balance the security needs of all parties. 
This process critically requires high-level buy-in, and can succeed only if all regional 
players participate. Each of the regional and external countries involved would 
79 BBC News (2018), ‘Trump says ready to meet Iran’s Rouhani’, 31 July 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- 
us-canada-45013683 (accessed 1 Aug. 2020).
80 Benaim, D. & Sullivan, J. (2020), ‘America’s Opportunity in the Middle East: Diplomacy Could Succeed Where 
Military Force has Failed’, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2020-05-22/
americas-opportunity-middle-east (accessed 1 Aug. 2020).
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be advised to appoint a non-partisan special envoy to manage the negotiations, 
which would include bilateral as well as multilateral tracks. Securing the support 
of Russia and China would be important to the success of this project.81
As a first step, the process would need to arrive at a shared set of principles to 
guarantee the objectives, and to commit to non-aggression and non-interference. 
The specific circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic provide a level playing field 
for health and humanitarian collaboration that could in turn foster the goodwill that 
may enable progress in tackling more contentious issues. Working groups will need 
to be convened on essential areas: arms control, nuclear security, maritime security, 
environmental cooperation, cultural exchanges, communication channels, etc. 
The US and the E3, as external guarantors of the process, should aim to put in place 
timelines and incentives, such as sanctions relief for Iran and security guarantees 
for the GCC countries, alongside pressure to keep the process on track. Resolving 
GCC tensions, including the Qatar dispute, addressing individual security concerns 
among the smaller GCC states, and stemming the growing militarization of the wider 
region – from the Persian Gulf to the East Mediterranean and North Africa – will also 
be critical elements in achieving greater symmetry in the regional balance of power, 
and in stabilizing conflict zones in Yemen, Libya and Syria. The complexity of these 
conflicts necessitates winning Russian and Chinese support, too.
If this opportunity is to evolve into a defined process, all parties will need to 
abandon zero-sum thinking. The GCC should thus focus on the objective of 
a reduction in Iran’s military support for non-state actors; while Iran must be 
equally modest in its aims, and resist demanding the removal of US troops from 
the region. A conservative shift in Iranian politics could very well obstruct this 
process, as could a potential succession in Saudi Arabia. Participation by Israel 
is necessary to the process, but the political sensitivities mean that this will need 
to be brokered bilaterally with the E3 and the US. Here, the UAE could also serve 
as a backchannel interlocutor.
The barriers to such an ambitious multilateral and multi-track process are great, 
and progress will not be achieved in the absence of committed leadership not just 
on the part of regional governments, but from the US and Europe. But without some 
movement towards dialogue and process-building, the Middle East’s interlocking 
tensions and crises will continue to be a source of instability. Ongoing conflicts, and 
Iran’s support for non-state actors across the region, alongside nuclear proliferation 
threats and growing regional militarization trends, will continue to draw US, EU and 
UK resources away from their own domestic and wider international security priorities.
The US administration would, above all, need to secure bipartisan support 
for a sustained diplomatic investment in what will inevitably be a long-term 
process. Committed EU and UK participation would further increase the chances 
of sustainability. If it does take hold, such an endeavour could in time stabilize 
the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen, begin the reconstruction process, and help 
foster good governance, prosperity and greater regional security for the long term.
81 For a fuller discussion, see Vakil, S. and Quilliam, N. (2019), Getting to a New Iran Deal: A Guide for Trump, 






‘Levelling the playing field’ with China, and a focus on 
domestic economic priorities, will remain key principles 
of US trade policy, no matter who is in the White House.
Marianne Schneider- 
Petsinger
With the US and global economy severely shocked by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the economic outlook will undoubtedly influence the choices facing the US in the 
months and years ahead. Irrespective of the outcome of November’s presidential 
election, many of the economic challenges will be the same, and how the US 
responds, as the world’s largest economy, will matter for everyone.
Trade was a key tool of the US’s global economic and foreign policy engagement 
even before Donald Trump made it a signature issue of his presidency. And in light 
of the growing securitization of both economic and tech policy, trade will continue 
to drive the US’s geo-economic agenda. But whether Washington’s approach will 
be more unilateral or multilateral, more inward-looking or focused on global 
leadership, or more belligerent or cooperative, hangs in the balance with 
the 2020 election.
What principles guide US trade policy?
Under the Trump administration, tensions between the US and China over trade 
and technology, trade frictions with some of the US’s closest allies (including the 
EU), the negotiation of a successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and the president’s vocal criticism of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) have cemented trade as a key issue.
What have been the driving principles? And will these continue to guide US trade 
policy for the next four years and beyond? Although some elements of Trump’s 
stance on trade are unique to his administration, others have the potential to 
become lasting aspects of US trade policy over the coming years.
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Trump’s focus on the US trade balance has guided the administration to target 
chiefly those countries with which the US runs the largest trade-in-goods deficits: 
China, the EU and Mexico.82 The misplaced emphasis on shrinking the US’s 
bilateral trade deficits is a Trump-specific driver, and will not be an enduring 
feature of US trade policy in the longer term. Although concerns over large and 
persistent global trade imbalances may be warranted, protectionist policies are 
unlikely to address them.
The present ‘zero-sum’ and transactional approach to trade will come to an 
end with the Trump administration, be this in January 2021 or 2025. But a focus 
on ‘fair trade’ and ‘levelling the playing field’ will continue to be key principles 
guiding US trade policy, regardless of who is in the White House.
President Trump has reinforced – albeit more through rhetoric than beneficial 
action – the nexus between trade policy and national security, and the link 
between trade and jobs. Structural drivers both at home and internationally mean 
that future administrations will also use trade policy measures to pursue the goals 
of strengthening national security and supporting US economic growth.
In particular, China’s mercantilist trade policies and practices, combined with 
the severity of the economic disruption caused by the coronavirus pandemic, 
have intensified the rethinking of globalization. In the context of the fragile US 
economic recovery, a Trump administration will likely step up efforts to reshore 
supply chains. As Democratic challenger, Joe Biden has pointed to an approach 
to supply chains and economic recovery that, not unlike Trump’s playbook, 
emphasizes domestic production and ‘Buy American’ plans.83 Thus, protectionist 
trends will not disappear. In contrast to Trump, however, Biden’s supply-chain 
strategy would focus on working with allies.
On the domestic front, the bipartisan consensus that underpinned broad support 
for globalization and open trade broke down before Trump was elected president. 
Paradoxically, even though Americans’ broad view of international trade is 
increasingly positive,84 free trade has become politically ‘homeless’ in the US. It is 
notable that while Democratic voters are gradually viewing trade more favourably,85 
the party in Congress – which has traditionally been more protectionist than the 
Republican Party – does not reflect this shift. A radical departure from the prevalent 
anti-trade sentiment in Congress cannot be expected any time soon.
Biden has not set out a standalone plan for US trade policy. Instead, his current 
(and likely future) approach sees trade policy integrated into a broader foreign 
policy and domestic agenda. He has said that ‘every decision about trade must 
82 U.S. Census Bureau (2020), ‘U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services (FT900) – Exhibit 20a. U.S. Trade 
in Goods by Selected Countries and Areas – BOP Basis’, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/
current_press_release/exh20a.pdf (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
83 Biden, J. (2020), ‘The Biden Plan to Rebuild U.S. Supply Chains and Ensure the U.S. Does Not Face Future 
Shortages of Critical Equipment’, https://joebiden.com/supplychains (accessed 31 Jul. 2020); Biden, J. (2020), 
‘The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future is “Made in All of America” by All of America’s Workers’, https://joebiden.com/
madeinamerica (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
84 Gallup (2019), Trade Under Trump, https://news.gallup.com/file/reports/267425/Trade_Under_Trump.pdf 
(accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
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be to build the American middle class’.86 As president, he would not enter into 
any new trade agreements until there is sufficient investment at home to enable 
US workers and businesses to compete globally.87 Dealing with the long-term 
public health and economic crisis stemming from the pandemic will also demand 
significant political capital. In short, much as when Barack Obama entered office 
in 2009 and focused on bringing the US out of the deep economic recession 
following the global financial crisis, trade negotiations would not be a priority 
at the outset of a Biden administration.
When the time is ripe to launch major trade initiatives, Democrats can be expected 
to put emphasis on labour standards and the environment. However, a paradigm 
shift to a progressive trade agenda early in a Biden administration is unlikely, given 
divisions within the Democratic Party itself and between the two parties. In the 
event that the Democrats control both houses of Congress, there could be a way 
forward at the right moment.
The key difference between a Trump and a Biden administration will be in the 
approach. Under a second term for President Trump, there will likely be a doubling 
down on an ‘America First’ trade policy approach, focusing on tariffs and the 
repatriation of supply chains – especially in light of the increasing tensions with 
China and the long-term economic effects of the pandemic. Under Biden, many 
of the concerns raised by the Trump administration will remain, but the rhetoric and 
the methods employed in addressing them would change. Greater emphasis is likely 
on working with partners and developing a joint framework on issues of shared 
concern such as China, and on a less antagonistic approach than seen under the 
present administration to managing areas of policy divergence among allies.
86 Biden (2020), ‘The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future is “Made in All of America” by All of America’s 
Workers’. A similar sentiment is expressed in Biden, J. (2020), ‘Why America Must Lead Again – Rescuing U.S. 
Foreign Policy After Trump’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
87 Biden (2020), ‘Why America Must Lead Again – Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump’.
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Key trade policy issues
The China challenge
The number-one challenge for US trade policy will be confronting China’s trade 
and tech policies and practices – including forced technology transfer, intellectual 
property (IP) theft, industrial subsidies, and the role of state-owned enterprises – 
and at the same time dealing with China’s security crackdown in Hong Kong and 
its human rights abuses in Xinjiang.
While there is a bipartisan consensus on the diagnosis of these critical concerns, 
there is disagreement over the remedy. Biden has opposed Trump’s unilateral course 
of action and recourse to tariffs to address China’s trade practices. Researchers, 
including at the New York Fed, have found that Trump’s tariffs have meant higher 
prices for US importers.88 If re-elected, it will be tempting for Trump to launch yet 
another round of tariffs to increase pressure on China, but this would undermine 
the fragile economic recovery at home.
Already, the US–China phase-one trade deal from January 2020 is on shaky 
ground, as China has fallen behind on its purchasing obligations.89 The agreement 
did not address many structural issues, such as China’s industrial subsidies and 
state-owned enterprises, which were meant to be dealt with during a second 
phase of negotiations. A phase-two deal under Trump is now increasingly unlikely, 
given the further deterioration in the US–China relationship.
Moreover, a deal with China will only be as good as its implementation. 
The effectiveness of the phase-one deal’s enforcement mechanism remains to 
be seen. As president, Biden would also seek to hold China accountable through 
the enforcement of trade rules, although his approach would likely put less 
emphasis on unilateral action compared with the Trump administration.
The nexus of trade, technology and national security will continue to be a key issue 
for any administration. US sanctions on Huawei, for instance, are unlikely to be 
eased. Efforts to cut the Chinese government and its firms off from US technology 
are set to increase – not only on national security grounds, but increasingly also in 
response to Beijing’s efforts to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, and human rights 
violations in Xinjiang. Under a Biden administration, issues of human rights and 
labour rights, along with digital surveillance and privacy protection, could become 
elevated points of tension between the US and China. Because it is unlikely that 
China is willing to address these issues in a meaningful way, the US will probably 
have to accept limited progress on human rights if it wants concessions on trade.
Linked to US security concerns over China’s dominance in high-tech sectors is 
the increased scrutiny of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2018 President Trump 
signed into law new rules that expanded the US government’s authority to review 
88 Higgins, M., Klitgaard, T. and Nattinger, M. (2019), ‘Who Pays the Tax on Imports from China?’, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, 25 November 2019, https://libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed.org/2019/11/who-pays-the-tax-on-imports-from-china.html (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
89 Bown, C. (2020), ‘US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods’, 25 September 2020, 
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the national security implications of FDI in the US. While the rules apply to any 
foreign investment, they were taken with a view to China. A further tightening 
of investment screening can be anticipated under either Trump or Biden.
The US stands a better chance of success in confronting what it perceives as China’s 
unfair trade and tech practices by liaising more closely with key allies. The US, the 
EU and Japan are China’s most important trading partners, and the three together 
account for approximately a third of China’s trade in goods.90 Joint efforts could 
generate more leverage in persuading China to act, in the interests of preserving its 
trading ties with the major industrial economies that are critical to its own economic 
growth and access to technology.
There have been some efforts under the Trump administration to work with the 
EU and Japan to tackle distortions from non-market economies.91 But if Trump 
remains in the White House for the next four years, possible greater friction with 
the US’s long-time allies could undermine further joint work on China. If Biden 
wins in November, his administration has the opportunity to build 
on the trilateral initiative.
A robust action plan for US collaboration with allies could involve widening 
participation in talks on countering trade-distortive practices to include the 
UK, Australia and Canada, among others, alongside the US, the EU and Japan. 
Under a Biden administration, the US and a coalition of like-minded allies could 
bring a comprehensive and bold case against China at the WTO.92 Developing 
a transatlantic consortium involving Huawei’s key competitors – notably Nokia 
and Ericsson – could help reduce the exposure of 5G infrastructure to Chinese tech 
firms on both sides of the Atlantic. Foreign investment screening is another area 
in which closer international collaboration could readily be fostered. In particular, 
closer cooperation between the EU, the US and its fellow members of the Five Eyes 
intelligence alliance (Australia, Canada, the UK and New Zealand) could strengthen 
the effectiveness of the various FDI screening mechanisms by supporting information 
exchange and coordination on cross-border transactions that raise common 
national security issues.
Such joint – and potentially mutually beneficial – efforts still raise the question 
of what the US under a Biden administration would be asking of its partners, 
and in what form the EU and other allies may be willing to confront China 
90 European Commission (2020), ‘China, Trade with World’, 8 May 2020, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_
results/factsheets/country/details_china_en.pdf (accessed 28 Sept. 2020).
91 The trade ministers of the US, the EU and Japan have been meeting intermittently since December 2017, and 
in January 2020 agreed on ‘ways to strengthen existing WTO rules on industrial subsidies’. See ‘Joint Statement 
of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union’, 14 January 
2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158567.pdf (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
92 Hillman, J. (2018), ‘Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Review Security Commission’, 8 June 2018, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hillman%20Testimony%20US%20China%20Comm%20w%20
Appendix%20A.pdf (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
The US stands a better chance of success in confronting 
what it perceives as China’s unfair trade and tech 
practices by liaising more closely with key allies.
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more vigorously and risk their commercial ties. Perhaps the US will ask the 
EU to strengthen its export controls regime and limit the sale of emerging 
technologies to China. The US could also demand that there is increased scrutiny 
of the transparency and accountability of Chinese companies listed on stock 
exchanges in Europe and Asia.
Overall, a second-term Trump administration can be expected to double down 
on efforts to sever the US’s economic ties with China, while a Biden administration 
would more likely look to manage the relationship to reduce dependence in critical 
products such as medical supplies or semiconductors. In any case – and with the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic having amplified existing calls for national 
self-sufficiency – at least a partial decoupling in strategic sectors seems inevitable.
Reform of the multilateral trade system and the WTO
The Trump administration has questioned the value of the WTO, and wants a reset 
of the organization. It has blocked appointments of new members to the WTO 
Appellate Body, which resulted in its paralysis in December 2019.93 Despite various 
reform efforts under way, a second Trump administration will in all likelihood 
remain uncompromising, perpetuating the Appellate Body gridlock. In the absence 
of a resolution, more countries will join the interim appeals mechanism set up by 
the EU and other WTO members.94 At the same time, the Trump administration can 
be expected to continue its engagement on other reform issues: the US has been 
active in discussions regarding an agreement on fisheries subsidies, in e-commerce 
negotiations, and in identifying new approaches concerning special and differential 
treatment for developing countries.
Should the US take forward the reform of the WTO Appellate Body under 
a Biden administration, it would fare better by putting forward a specific reform 
proposal – instead of simply reiterating current grievances. Even then, the dispute 
settlement crisis will not easily be resolved, as many of the US’s concerns regarding 
the Appellate Body predate the Trump administration and are shared by many 
other countries (even if they disapprove of Trump’s tactics). Moreover, unless 
the underlying trade tensions between the US and China – and also between the 
US and its allies (notably the EU) – are addressed, it is hard to see how there can 
be any meaningful WTO reform. Thus, while a Biden presidency would certainly 
mean a return to more collaborative US engagement and leadership in the global 
trade system, reform of the WTO is not guaranteed.
The coronavirus pandemic has added further complexity to an already packed WTO 
reform agenda. The wide use of domestic subsidies to fight the severe economic blow 
dealt by COVID-19 raises the prospect of a wave of disputes at the WTO, as many 
countries consider these measures to be ‘trade distorting’. This could, in particular, 
93 For more background, see Schneider-Petsinger, M. (2020), Reforming the World Trade Organization: Prospects 
for transatlantic cooperation and the global trade system, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/reforming-world-trade-organization- 
prospects-transatlantic-cooperation-and-global-trade (accessed 28 Sept. 2020).
94 European Commission (2020), ‘Interim appeal arrangement for WTO disputes becomes effective’, 
30 April 2020, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2143 (accessed 31 Jul. 2020).
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end up as a transatlantic minefield. Moreover, US subsidies or tax incentives – for 
instance to the semiconductor industry – could leave Washington open to accusations 
of double standards when it comes to disciplining Beijing’s practices.
Other trade negotiations
Immediately on taking office as president in 2017, Donald Trump followed through 
on his campaign pledge to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
a centrepiece of the Obama administration’s trade policy. As vice-president, Joe 
Biden supported the deal. He still regards it as an important counterweight to China’s 
economic influence, but he would (and could) not take the US straight into what has 
since entered into force among the remaining 11 signatories as the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Instead, Biden 
can be expected to seek to renegotiate the terms of the agreement in a way that 
addresses domestic opposition across the political spectrum and across US labour 
and environmental groups. More than 20 TPP provisions have been suspended in the 
CPTPP, including rules on intellectual property that the US had pushed for in the 
original agreement. Many CPTPP countries would in principle welcome the US back 
with open arms, but the Biden administration would be unwise to expect substantial 
concessions to its interests.
President Trump also fulfilled his campaign promise to renegotiate NAFTA. 
Biden has supported what has become the United States–Mexico–Canada 
Agreement (USMCA), as it leaves most of the original NAFTA provisions intact 
and also draws on the TPP. However, either administration will likely encounter 
implementation issues, and this could pose some challenges for the US’s trade 
relationship with Canada and Mexico.
With the phase-one US–China deal, the USMCA and two initial US–Japan trade 
agreements nominally under its belt, a second Trump administration would likely 
focus more on trade relations with Europe. Negotiations are already under way for 
US trade arrangements with the EU and with the UK. Along with the traditional 
sticking points related to market access, and food and health concerns, bilateral 
trade tensions (for instance related to the long-standing Boeing–Airbus dispute or 
the US’s imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs in the name of national security) 
will continue to stall progress. The issue of digital services taxes will likely become 
an even greater source of tensions in the period ahead. Moreover, if the EU goes 
ahead with plans for a carbon border tax, this would become a flashpoint in 
transatlantic trade relations under Trump.
In contrast, a Biden administration may be expected to engage in a way that 
ought to make the transatlantic trade relationship less fraught and more stable – 
for example by rolling back his predecessor’s tariffs on steel and aluminum, 
and removing the tariff threat on automobiles and parts. Nonetheless, reviving 
negotiations with the EU along the lines of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) is unlikely, as those talks were already in trouble before Trump 
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entered the White House. Biden could instead pick up the negotiations started 
by the current administration with the EU, and make progress before the current 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expires in July 2021 and needs to be renewed.95
For a Biden administration, repairing the transatlantic trade relationship, 
and working with the EU and the UK to fix the multilateral trade system, will 
require careful management of areas of divergence between the US and Europe. 
For example, transatlantic differences over digital services taxes need to be 
isolated from other areas where there is scope for greater progress. This could 
be achieved more easily if the US recommits to negotiations regarding digital 
taxation under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD).96
The bottom line
The key challenges facing the US with regard to trade – chief among them how best 
to deal with an assertive China, reform of the WTO, and strengthening supply-chain 
resilience for the post-pandemic era – will be the same no matter who occupies the 
White House next year. Despite significant presidential powers on trade, Congress 
plays a critical role and could seek to reassert control of US trade policy.97 Increased 
partisanship will not go away anytime soon; nor will internal political divisions 
within the Democratic and Republican parties be readily overcome. These structural 
factors and constraints limit the potential for a large-scale realignment of US trade 
policy. At the same time, the trade policies and approaches of a Biden administration 
would look very different from those of a second Trump administration.
Trade policy begins and ends at home, meaning that either administration will 
need to build domestic support for its trade agenda. But trade policy also needs 
to be considered as part of the wider context. It is not the main cause of many of the 
most pressing challenges facing the US; nor is it the main cure. A well-formulated 
and well-executed trade policy can, however, play an important role as part of 
a comprehensive approach to tackling domestic inequality, competing internationally, 
and addressing climate change.
95 Congress delegates authority to the president to negotiate free-trade agreements through TPA. It sets out 
negotiation objectives and provides for expedited legislative consideration (via an up-or-down vote without 
the opportunity for amendments), as long as certain notification and consultation requirements are met. Because 
TPA is extended only for a limited time, Congress has to periodically renew it and determine future negotiation 
objectives. TPA – currently authorized to 1 July 2021 – has become a contentious political issue, which has led 
to lapses in the past.
96 In June 2020 the US paused discussions of Pillar 1 (which concerns the allocation of taxing rights), but it is still 
seeking to conclude talks regarding Pillar 2 (on a global minimum tax) before the end of 2020.
97 Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution gives Congress exclusive power to impose tariffs and ‘to regulate 






A US administration that is committed to climate action 
could lead global efforts to build a cleaner recovery from 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sam Geall and  
Tim G. Benton
The UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) will take place in Glasgow in 
November 2021, five years after the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 
climate change. This is a critical juncture. The latest scientific analysis indicates 
temperature rise in excess of 3°C over pre-industrial levels if atmospheric carbon 
dioxide concentrations double, which the world is on course to reach around 2060 
at current rates of emissions.98 According to the UN Environment Programme,99 
to reach the global target of 1.5°C set under the Paris Agreement, countries will 
need to collectively increase fivefold their existing commitments to reduce 
emissions over the next decade. 
All countries and blocs will need to demonstrate their commitment to, and 
ambition on, climate action in the run-up to the Glasgow talks. What the US does 
over the coming year, and in particular its relationship with China, may determine 
the trajectory the parties to the conference take – and, ultimately, whether the 
world succeeds in averting catastrophic climate change.
The joint announcement on climate change made by President Xi Jinping 
and Barack Obama100 in late 2014 drew a line under the ‘blame game’ that had 
followed the collapse of climate negotiations at Copenhagen (COP15) in 2009. 
98 Forster, P., Hausfather, Z., Hegerl, G., Sherwood, S. and Armour, K. (2020), ‘Guest post: Why low-end ‘climate 
sensitivity’ can now be ruled out’, CarbonBrief, 22 July 2020, https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-low- 
end-climate-sensitivity-can-now-be-ruled-out (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
99 United Nations Environment Programme (2019), ‘Cut global emissions by 7.6 percent every year for next 
decade to meet 1.5 degrees Celsius Paris target – UN Report’, 26 November 2019, https://www.unenvironment.org/ 
news-and-stories/press-release/cut-global-emissions-76-percent-every-year-next-decade-meet-15degc 
(accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
100 The White House (2014), ‘U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean Energy 
Cooperation’, 11 November 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/fact-
sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-energy-c (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
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The rapprochement helped pave the way for the signing of the Paris Agreement. 
Cooperation on climate became the most productive dimension of the China–US 
relationship, leading to substantive collaboration and on-the-ground pilot projects 
through initiatives such as the US–China Climate Change Working Group and 
the US–China Clean Energy Research Center. This cooperation has diminished 
significantly under the Trump administration. 
Xi Jinping’s unilateral pledge, made at the UN General Assembly in September 
2020, that China will work to reach carbon neutrality by 2060 highlights 
how far the US’s own standing has fallen on climate action.101 But the current 
lack of detail on China’s nearer-term implementation measures, and credible 
concerns that China may still backslide on coal, point to the continued need 
for international partnerships.
What, then, may be the consequences of the outcome of the November 2020 
presidential election for environmental governance? If Donald Trump remains 
in office, concludes the process of withdrawing the US from the Paris Agreement, 
and pursues a second term based on creating an enduring legacy for US fossil 
fuel interests and environmental deregulation, what does this mean for global 
cooperation on climate change? If Joe Biden is elected president, to what extent 
will there be a change of direction under his administration? Will it be possible 
to roll-back the ‘Trump effect’?
The Trump effect
As president, Donald Trump has gutted environmental protection in the US. 
By July 2020 his administration had abolished 68 environmental regulations, 
including on phasing out inefficient lightbulbs and HFC (hydrofluorocarbon) 
‘super pollutants’ in air conditioners and refrigerators; methane pollution from 
oil and gas infrastructure; and emissions standards for cars and trucks.102 The 
Trump administration has dismantled the Clean Power Plan, replacing President 
Obama’s signature climate policy with a far weaker rule,103 and has been vocal 
in his efforts to undermine the science of climate change.104
During 2020, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened the 
administration’s focus on support for fossil fuel jobs, as already provided for in the 
2017 Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 
and the 2019 Executive Order on Promoting Energy Infrastructure and Energy 
Growth. The federal bailout of US industries affected by the pandemic notably 
offers no benefits for the clean energy sector, but includes concessions to oil, gas 
101 UN News (2020), ‘‘Enhance solidarity’ to fight COVID-19, Chinese President urges, also pledges carbon neutrality 
by 2060’, 22 September 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073052 (accessed 30 Sept. 2020).
102 Popovich, N. and Tabuchi, H. (2020), ‘Tracking the Environmental Rules Reversed Under Trump’, New York Times, 
13 May 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/climate/nyt-climate-newsletter-trump-rollbacks.html?search 
ResultPosition=5 (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
103 Irfan, U. (2019), ‘Trump’s EPA just replaced Obama’s signature climate policy with a much weaker rule’, Vox, 
19 June 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/6/19/18684054/climate-change-clean-power-plan-repeal-affordable- 
emissions (accessed 9 Sept. 2020).
104 Cheung, H. (2020), ‘What does Trump actually believe on climate change?’, BBC, 23 January 2020, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-51213003 (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
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and coal companies to the tune of billions of dollars – including at least $3.9 billion 
from the Paycheck Protection Program.105 Marathon Petroleum is expected to claim 
a $1.1 billion tax refund due to the coronavirus stimulus law enacted in March. 
Of greatest global consequence, in November 2019 the Trump administration 
formally notified the UN of its intention to withdraw the US from the Paris 
Agreement, effective one year later.106 This, as with the administration’s wider 
aversion to multilateralism – discussed in relation to various international 
institutions in other chapters of this paper – has weakened the global 
cooperation that is critically needed to mitigate climate change.
Re-election for Trump in November 2020 would likely entrench his administration’s 
commitment to US ‘energy dominance’ through expanded fossil fuel production,107 
as well as bring further attacks on the science of climate change, including though 
reduced budgets for related scientific programmes.108
Market and technological dynamics mean that the US economy may continue 
to decarbonize despite the antipathy of the Trump administration. However, the 
signalled US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, due to take effect the day after 
the election, could have serious repercussions for other signatories’ commitment 
to cooperation on mitigating climate change. Trump’s unilateral ‘laggardship’, 
in the assessment of one group of researchers, ‘reduces the prospects for reaching 
the 2°C target to near zero and will entail a substantial effect on long-run global 
emissions, even if the next president should re-enter the Agreement’.109
Can a new administration restore 
global climate leadership?
If it so chooses, however, the next US administration could take a leading position 
on global efforts to address climate change. In particular, the US could take the 
opportunity to lead on efforts to build a cleaner recovery from COVID-19: one that 
helps to restore nature, climate and health.
The current global health and climate crises both underscore the deep 
interdependencies of our environment and the globalized economy, and the 
resulting need for international cooperation, leadership and foresight. It also 
shows very vividly how each and all of these can be set back by rivalry, suspicion 
and protectionism among critical global interests.
105 Raskin, S. B. (2020), ‘Why is the FED Spending So Much Money on a Dying Industry?’, New York Times, 
28 May 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/opinion/fed-fossil-fuels.html (accessed 18 Aug. 2020). 
106 The US withdrawal is due to take effect, following a mandatory one-year notice period, the day after the 
2020 US elections. Holden, E. (2019), ‘Trump begins year-long process to formally exit Paris climate agreement’, 
Guardian, 5 November 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/04/donald-trump-climate- 
crisis-exit-paris-agreement (accessed 9 Sept. 2020).
107 White House (2020), ‘President Donald J. Trump Has Unleashed American Producers and Restored our 
Energy Dominance’, 29 July 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-
unleashed-american-producers-restored-energy-dominance (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
108 Mervis, J. (2020), ‘Trump’s new budget cuts all but favoured few science programs’, ScienceMag, 11 February 
2020, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/02/trump-s-new-budget-cuts-all-favored-few-science-programs 
(accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
109 Sælen, H., Hovi, J., Sprinz, D., and Underdal, A. (2020), ‘How US withdrawal might influence cooperation 
under the Paris climate agreement’, Environmental Science & Policy, 108: pp. 121–132, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.envsci.2020.03.011 (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
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An effort by the next US administration to re-engage with climate change 
as a central element of foreign policy would be crucially important for global 
economic coordination on the post-coronavirus recovery, as well as sending a key 
signal as regards US engagement on climate policy and multilateralism – to allies, 
to markets and to international institutions – at a time of deep flux and uncertainty. 
Undoubtedly, too, it would give the US a valuable ‘soft power’ boost at a time when 
its reputation has been severely damaged by the current administration’s handling 
of the pandemic; by heavy-handed responses to protests for racial justice; and by its 
seeming disregard for the interests of traditional allies and long-standing alliances.110
US re-engagement on climate policy has to begin at home, with the next 
administration first demonstrating a commitment to substantially increase its own 
mitigation ambitions: for example, by setting a net zero 2050 target for US domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions; reversing the dismantling of environmental rules 
since 2017; and putting in place effective laws and regulations to achieve this 
critical climate goal.
While the federal government has given little support to the clean energy sector 
under Trump’s presidency, wind, solar and storage projects are increasingly 
being planned and approved in the US, driven by markets and economics as well 
as by political and social pressure. One recent analysis notably projected that the 
US would add record levels of solar photovoltaic and energy storage capacity – 
18 GW and 1.2 GW respectively – in 2020.111 
Nevertheless, COVID-19 has limited the availability of financing for green energy 
initiatives. This is hitting important areas like residential energy efficiency hard, 
and is undermining critical efforts not just to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
but also to create and sustain the jobs that the energy transformation could 
provide. Government intervention is urgently required, beginning with stimulus 
funding to support the clean energy sector.
A more ambitious vision along the lines of the ‘Green New Deal’ concept would 
entail a huge expansion of public investment that could be used to drive a recovery 
that benefits workers. Green job creation represents an enormous opportunity. 
A major report published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in June 2020 
set out a sustainable recovery plan that, in its assessment, could save or create some 
9 million jobs annually around the world over the next three years.112 The ‘modular’ 
nature of renewable energy projects, and the number of households requiring 
110 Sonenshine, T. (2020), ‘American prestige hits rock bottom’, The Hill, June 26 2020, https://thehill.com/
opinion/international/504754-american-prestige-hits-rock-bottom (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
111 Ashmore, J., Cleveland, C. and Fox-Penner, P. (2020), ‘The US Clean-Energy Transition in the Era of COVID-19: 
The Prospects Remain Robust’, Oxford Energy Forum, Issue 123: pp. 39–41, https://www.oxford 
energy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/OEF123.pdf (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
112 IEA (2020), ‘Sustainable Energy World Outlook Special Report’, https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable- 
recovery (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
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energy efficiency upgrades, together with the short lead times of both these areas 
of activity, mean that a low-carbon stimulus has the potential to create jobs very 
rapidly, especially compared with traditional infrastructure projects with inherently 
long lead times.113
Without major and sustained investment, the US risks missing out on opportunities 
to create low-carbon jobs and technology leadership in sectors like electric vehicles. 
The International Renewable Energy Agency assessed that China accounted for 
39 per cent of all jobs in renewable energy globally in 2018, and Asia overall 
for 60 per cent of the global total.114 However, for the US to pursue job creation 
in renewables through a unilateral ‘green deal’ is not the solution: without global 
coordination, an aggressive low-carbon pathway brings the risk of carbon leakage, 
whereby polluting companies relocate to countries with less strict emissions controls.
A US administration that is committed to climate action could make such global 
coordination, now all the more urgent in the context of the post-coronavirus 
recovery, a priority. For this to be credible, the US must rejoin the Paris Agreement 
as a minimum, and as part of this set out an ambitious climate pledge in the form of its 
nationally determined contribution (NDC – the core commitment of each party to the 
agreement). But given the long-standing distrust of US good faith resulting from 
its previous failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (from which it withdrew under the 
presidency of George W. Bush in 2001), since compounded by President Trump’s 
disavowal of the Paris Agreement, rejoining Paris must not be an end in itself.
The US will need to demonstrate commitment to climate science, and to enhancing 
global climate action – around (but not limited to) resilience, mitigation and 
finance – through public diplomacy and actions that go beyond the Paris Agreement. 
These include the rebuilding of bilateral relationships with major emitters – chief 
among them China, India, Indonesia and the EU – and advocacy through multilateral 
processes and forums like the G7, the G20 and a reconstituted Major Economies 
Forum.115 But perhaps the most important task for a new US administration is to 
forge a rapprochement with China on climate.
Rebuilding US–China climate cooperation
‘[I]f we want to have a free 21st century, and not the Chinese century of which 
Xi Jinping dreams, the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t 
get it done,’ said Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in his speech at the Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library in July 2020: ‘We must not continue it and we must 
not return to it.’116
113 Quiggin, D. (2020), ‘Green Industries Can Accelerate a True Jobs-Focused Recovery’, Chatham House Expert 
Comment, 23 June 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/green-industries-can-accelerate- 
true-jobs-focused-recovery (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
114 International Renewable Energy Agency (2019), Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2019, 
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Pompeo’s hawkish doctrine on US relations with China may not endure under 
the next administration, but the wider geopolitical tensions between the two, 
which have escalated over the past four years – as explored in other chapters 
of this paper – are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, as is the potential 
for escalation. A detente will not come easily, whichever administration is in the 
White House from 2021.
All the same, the success of any future climate regime will be crucially dependent 
on there being a cooperative relationship between China and the US; the two are 
the world’s largest carbon polluters, together responsible for more than 40 per cent 
of global annual emissions. A new US administration will need to work to restore 
climate change mitigation as a critical element of the relationship with China. 
As part of this, joint technical cooperation efforts established under the Obama 
administration – some of which continue to exist in diminished form, as do US–China 
subnational initiatives – could be reconstituted and reprioritized with relative ease.
Such a relationship on climate change is important for China’s climate policies, 
domestic and international, and for the global climate regime, as much as for the US’s 
standing in the world. President Xi’s new announcement of a 2060 carbon neutrality 
target may have rightly drawn headlines and praise, but nearer-term measures 
will be critical to mitigation efforts, particularly to avoid locking in high-carbon 
technological pathways. China is currently formulating its 14th Five-Year Plan, 
for the period 2021–25, which will include climate targets, at the same time as 
it is launching a stimulus programme in response to COVID-19 and preparing 
for next year’s COP26.
Early indications about the provisions of the Five-Year Plan are a cause for concern: 
although it may include a carbon emissions cap for the first time, there have also 
been proposals for a looser cap on coal-fired capacity – specifically, to allow it to 
rise by around 200 GW over the next decade, to 1,300 GW in total.117
While many of the drivers of China’s policies on climate and the environment 
are domestic, tensions with the US pose an underestimated threat to the climate, 
not least as they encourage China to pursue energy self-sufficiency through coal. 
Planning for a possible ‘war-footing’ in the face of rising geopolitical tensions may 
mean that policymakers are more receptive to the case made by vested interests 
that continuing to develop domestic coal improves China’s energy security.118 
Similarly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), if it acts as an ‘escape valve’ for Chinese 
overcapacity and shrinking domestic markets by exporting carbon-intensive 
production overseas, could undermine the vision of a cleaner, more modern and 
sustainable power sector in many countries, particularly those at an important 
inflection point in their development. International engagement – in part supported 
by the US – may be key to achieving a greener BRI.
117 Baxter, T. and Yao, Z. (2019), ‘The 14th Five Year Plan: what ideas are on the table?’, China Dialogue, 
7 August 2019, https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/11434-the-14th-five-year-plan-what-ideas-are-on- 
the-table (accessed 9 Sept. 2019).
118 Geall, S. (2020), ‘China still needs to curb King Coal’, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/
a8c082b4-5ac9-4446-bd4f-756bad11f765?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754ec6 
(accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
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A new US administration might not immediately ratchet down tensions with 
China. But in re-engaging in global efforts on climate change mitigation it could 
help to bolster low-carbon alternative pathways in partnership with China and BRI 
countries, as well with partners like the EU; Indo-Pacific allies like Australia, India 
and Japan; and international institutions in working to shape the rules around 
finance to least-developed countries.
The global order has changed dramatically in the five years since COP21 
and the negotiation of the Paris Agreement. An impact of this that specifically 
undermines international efforts at climate change mitigation is that the concepts 
and institutions that guided previous bilateral engagement between the US and 
China may no longer be fit for purpose, partly because they have been undermined 
by the Trump administration.
The framing of a new US–China relationship, therefore, will need to take account 
of a new reality likely shaped by strategic rivalry and sharply contrasting values. 
Yet common interests in climate security can and should necessitate continued 
engagement, through technical exchange, the building of trust, and coordinated 
efforts on climate change mitigation.
An analogy for a possible way forward might be the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT), undertaken by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
and which saw a commitment to pursue arms control agreements even at points 
of deep tension between the nuclear superpowers.
Another approach, alongside other trust-building cooperative actions, could lie 
in the renewed fostering of more competitive economic dynamics between the 
US and China, such as through border adjustment taxes (BATs) – currently being 
discussed in the EU – whereby a carbon-adjusted price on imports from outside 
the US would be imposed to prevent carbon leakage.
The US and China can and should also work cooperatively on establishing joint 
clean energy standards and guidelines, and perhaps on international carbon trading. 
In addition, the US administration could support greater Chinese engagement with 
(and eventually membership of) the IEA, helping to build reassurance on energy 
security and joint engagement at multilateral level.
Economic recovery after COVID-19
Regardless, the opportunity exists after COVID-19 for the US president to 
make global coordination on the recovery – to ‘build back better’, as is frequently 
repeated – an important aspect of foreign policy, unlocking significant economic 
effects for the low-carbon technology transition, given the massive financial flows 
that will be channelled into recovering from the pandemic.
The US still has considerable diplomatic clout, and despite distrust around its 
engagement with environmental processes, it can send important signals to markets, 
investors and states that could help to accelerate a low-carbon transition pathway 
for the economic recovery.
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This would play out in a critical year in the run-up to COP26 in November 2021. 
Not only will states produce their NDCs, but there will be a series of meetings 
and events that could help to coordinate international ambition, including the 
World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings; the Convention on Biological Diversity 
COP 15 (China); the G7 (UK); and the G20 (Italy).
Through all these forums, a US that has reaffirmed its commitment to climate 
science, reinvigorated its approach to climate action – and shown itself willing 
to play a constructive role in cooperation with the UK, the EU and other major 
emitters – could play a transformative role. In the alternative scenario, the US will 
sit outside the Paris Agreement, dealing a further blow to domestic and global 
climate ambitions, multilateral cooperation and key bilateral relationships. 
Recovery from such a blow may be near impossible.
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The US and global 
health security
By re-engaging in multilateral cooperation on global 
health security, the US can better protect its own citizens 
and economy, and build up capacity to withstand the next 
public health emergency.
Amy Pope
The COVID-19 pandemic has given rise to the worst public health crisis in 
a generation. In the US alone, some 7.7 million cases had been confirmed by 
mid-October 2020, and more than 213,000 deaths.119 Globally, there have been 
infections in nearly every country, with cases already numbering some 38 million. 
The virus has changed the way people live, work, travel and supply goods, and will 
have far-reaching consequences for years to come. There has been no issue that has 
more dramatically affected the course of the Trump presidency, and no issue that 
has so clearly highlighted the negative impact of the US’s return to isolationism 
over the last four years.
The possibility of a severe pandemic with far-reaching health, social and economic 
consequences has long been predicted.120 Over the last two decades, there have 
been a range of infectious disease threats – from H1N1, H5N1 and H7N9 influenza, 
to the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East 
respiratory syndrome (MERS). The 2014–16 West African Ebola epidemic was the 
largest Ebola outbreak ever recorded. And in 2016 the World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern after 
119 World Health Organization (2020), ‘WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard’, https://covid19.who.
int/region/amro/country/us (accessed 14 Oct. 2020).
120 Hoffower, H. (2020), ‘Bill Gates has been warning of a global health threat for years. Here are 12 people who 
seemingly predicted the coronavirus pandemic’. Business Insider, 13 May 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/
people-who-seemingly-predicted-the-coronavirus-pandemic-2020-3?r=US&IR=T#infectious-disease-expert- 
michael-osterholm-has-also-been-warning-of-a-global-pandemic-for-the-past-decade-3 (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
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a widespread epidemic of Zika fever, caused by a mosquito-borne virus, revealed 
an association between infection in pregnant women and clusters of microcephaly 
and other neurological disorders in their infants.
A pandemic caused by a respiratory pathogen has been the main focus of pandemic 
preparedness efforts. The evidence suggested that the costs of a highly contagious 
respiratory illness would be inevitable and devastating. SARS, for example, had 
been estimated to have cost the world well over $30 billion.121 More importantly, 
recent outbreaks of various kinds had highlighted key deficiencies in the abilities 
of countries to quickly contain an infectious disease outbreak. Despite the warnings 
of experts for the last several decades, and the implementation of programmes 
designed to strengthen preparedness and response capacities across the world, 
several assessments had judged that much of the world remained unprepared 
to respond adequately to a pandemic.122
In the US, President Trump’s response to the pandemic, and its impact both 
at home and across the world, has veered between hubris, denial and the shifting 
of responsibility. This has left constituents and partners confused and disappointed. 
Not only has the US stepped back from the global leadership role it has typically 
played in the post-war era; it has undermined its own credibility by failing to 
manage an effective response to the spread of infection within its own borders.
There are no grounds for optimism that the coronavirus pandemic will be contained 
by the time the next administration takes office, in January 2021. The US has already 
squandered much of the goodwill it had with partner countries on any number 
of issues over the last four years; and now, without a significant shift in direction 
in tackling the far-reaching consequences of COVID-19, the US risks permanently 
losing its capacity to act effectively as a global leader. These consequences are not 
limited to its ability to build up its own resilience to the next pandemic – although 
in the age of mass travel, global supply chains and rapid urbanization that is certainly 
a major risk. What the present pandemic has underscored is that the stress on many 
already impoverished communities will likely impact governance and regional 
stability, and trigger new waves of migration, extremism and violence, all of 
which will have consequences for the US. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 
handling of the coronavirus, and its lack of regard for neighbouring countries in 
121 Lee, J.-W. and McKibbin, W. J. (2004), ‘Estimating the Global Economic Costs of SARS’, in Institute of Medicine 
(2004), Learning from SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak: Workshop Summary, Washington, DC: 
The National Academies Press, pp. 92–109.
122 See for example European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2011), ‘WHO’s Final Report on the 
functioning of the International Health Regulations (IHR) in relation to the 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic – the 
Fineberg report’, ECDC comment, 13 June 2011, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/whos-final- 
report-functioning-international-health-regulations-ihr-relation-2009-ah1n1; London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine (2015), ‘Independent panel of global experts calls for critical reforms to prevent future 
pandemics’, https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2015/ebola_report.html (accessed 24 Sept. 2020).
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their own efforts to fight the spread of infection and mitigate the impacts of the virus, 
could prolong the outbreak and cause even greater harm to people and economies 
globally, thus compounding the damage the US has already inflicted on itself.
The US’s global health leadership role, 
pre-Trump and pre-COVID
The US has contributed to international action on global health over many 
decades, and across both Republican and Democratic administrations. The US 
was a founding member of WHO in 1948, and while there has always been some 
tension between national and multilateral interests, the last two decades have 
witnessed a sustained commitment to US global leadership on this issue. In 1999, 
the Clinton administration’s National Security Strategy equated international 
epidemics with war or terrorist acts as threats to human life, and recognized that 
‘the resulting burden on health systems can undermine hard-won advances 
in economic and social development and contribute to the failure of fledgling 
democracies’.123 ‘The international community is at times reluctant to act without 
American leadership,’ the report stated. ‘In some instances, the United States is the 
only nation capable of providing the necessary leadership and capabilities 
for an international response to shared challenges.’ 124
Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the US remained committed to its 
responsibility to engage at the multilateral level on global health. In the wake of the 
SARS epidemic in 2002–03, for instance, the US participated actively in WHO’s work 
to revise the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005), the binding international 
legal framework to guide countries in preventing, protecting against, controlling 
and responding to public health risks. Most significantly, through the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), instituted in 2003, the US made the 
‘largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in human history’.125 
123 United States National Security Council, The White House (1999), A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century, p. 3, https://clintonwhitehouse5.archives.gov/media/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
124 Ibid.
125 The White House, President George W. Bush (2008), ‘Office of National AIDS Policy’, https://georgewbush- 
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/hivaids (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
The 9/11 attacks on the US mainland, and the anthrax 
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President Bush sought relatively significant resources from Congress, amounting 
to $15 billion over five years, embracing this action as being in the country’s 
‘moral, practical, and national security’ interests.126
The 9/11 attacks on the US mainland, and the anthrax attacks that followed 
soon after in the autumn of 2001, brought urgent scrutiny of the US’s potential 
vulnerability to extreme shocks, including not just terrorism and bioterrorism, 
but biological threats such as an infectious disease pandemic. In 2005 the federal 
government drafted the first National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza;127 and in 
2008 the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) 
was established, within the Department of Health and Human Services, with 
a mission to develop vaccines for unanticipated infectious diseases.128
In 2009, within months of taking office, the Obama administration was confronted 
with the H1N1 pandemic, which infected more than 60 million Americans in the 
course of a year.129 As well as managing the domestic response, the US worked with 
WHO, and through the organization’s intergovernmental processes, to mitigate 
the global impact of the pandemic. Through this cooperation, the US contributed 
substantively to the development of guidance on surveillance and the use of 
antiviral drugs, and of the pandemic influenza preparedness framework for 
the distribution of vaccines.
Building on lessons learned from H1N1 and other infectious disease outbreaks, 
and recognizing that it was in the US’s interest to increase the health capacity 
of its global partners, in 2014 the Obama administration launched the Global 
Health Security Agenda (GHSA).130 As part of the GHSA, participating countries 
identify metrics for assessing the capacity of countries to respond to public health 
challenges, independently assess them through the joint external evaluation 
process, then tailor assistance plans to increase that capacity. The initiative was 
not wholly altruistic. Underlying the US’s financial and resource commitment 
was a recognition that if an infectious disease overwhelms the response capacity 
of the country in which it originates, it could quickly spread and destabilize 
others in a region – and perhaps globally.
These principles were tested by the 2014–16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 
Although only a small number of cases were recorded in the US, that they occurred 
at all revealed gaps in infection control, border controls, public health connectivity 
and resourcing to manage the outbreak. The US response – to significantly increase 
126 Pilling, D. (2019), ‘Why George W Bush is Africa’s favourite US president’, Financial Times, 17 July 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/72424694-a86e-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04 (accessed 3 Aug. 2020); Dietrich, 
J. W. (2007), ‘The Politics of PEPFAR: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief’, Ethics & International 
Affairs, Volume 21.3 (Fall 2007), https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/journal/21_3/essay/001 
(accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
127 Homeland Security Council (2005), National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/
pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf (accessed 23 Sept. 2020).
128 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2020), ‘Public Health Emergency: Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority’, https://www.phe.gov/about/barda/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 
23 Sept. 2020).
129 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2010), ‘The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary 
Highlights, April 2009–April 2010’, updated 16 June 2010, https://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm 
(accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
130 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (2015), ‘FACTSHEET: The Global Health Security Agenda’, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/28/fact-sheet-global-health-security-agenda; 
Global Health Security Agenda (undated), ‘About the GHSA’, https://ghsagenda.org/home/about-the-ghsa 
(accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
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support to West African countries, and to partner with the UK and France, among 
others, on a comprehensive response strategy – was an investment not just in the 
region, but in US public health.131 There was a consensus, since borne out by the 
experience of the current COVID-19 pandemic, that once there is community 
transmission of a virus in any US urban area, the ability to quickly contain it – 
and to minimize public and political anxiety – reduces dramatically. Following 
the Ebola outbreak, the Obama administration documented these lessons learned 
in multiple after-action reports, by drafting a detailed early-response ‘playbook’, and 
by establishing a National Security Council directorate within the White House, with 
a primary mission to identify and mitigate possible new infectious disease threats.132 
By bringing high-level political attention to this issue, the goal was to increase 
support for the strongest possible response in the event of the next outbreak.
The common thread running through these prior administrations, therefore, was 
the understanding that infectious disease response was apolitical; that it was the 
responsibility of the federal government to build on the lessons learned from past 
outbreaks in order to improve response to the next; and that a public health threat 
such as a catastrophic infectious disease outbreak could be as destabilizing to US 
national security as a terrorist attack.
Despite the recognition that the US could not effectively control a global infectious 
disease outbreak on its own, and notwithstanding considerable investments in 
improving preparedness and response capacity, neither the Bush nor the Obama 
administration left office having built up sufficient resources and political will 
to ensure the response capabilities needed to effectively manage a pandemic like 
COVID-19. While the post-9/11 anthrax attacks, SARS in 2009–10 and Ebola in 
2014 –16 accelerated investment in infectious disease response, this capability 
remained relatively weak and fractured in comparison with US investment 
in ‘traditional’ counterterrorism measures over the same period.
Thus, while countless officials agreed on the need for greater coordination and 
investment, there remained significant gaps in the US’s ability to manage an outbreak 
on the scale now seen with the coronavirus pandemic. This was particularly the case 
with regard to funding, even after a significant injection of resources as part of an 
Ebola supplemental. Furthermore, the realization that infectious disease response 
needed to be major part of the national security apparatus still had not taken hold 
across the federal bureaucracy. The Obama administration took steps to change that 
perception, but it was anticipated that the successor administration would need 
to continue to build on this foundational work if the US was to have the capacity 
to withstand the next major infectious disease outbreak.
131 Kirchhoff, C. M. (2016), Memorandum for Ambassador Susan E. Rice: NSC Lessons Learned Study on Ebola, 
11 July 2016, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6817684-NSC-Ebola-Lessons-Learend-Report- 
FINAL-8-28-16.html (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
132 Executive Office of the President of the United States (2017), Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence 
Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and Biological Incidents, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/681 
9258-Playbook.html#document/p2 (accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
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The US response to COVID-19
As has been clearly seen in its handling of the current pandemic, the Trump 
administration failed to draw on the lessons of the recent past. The response 
of the US government to COVID-19 has, moreover, been unprecedented in its 
politicization, and in its role in heightening the confusion and tensions around the 
disease. At every turn – from dismantling the National Security Council directorate, 
to marginalizing the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
publicly disparaging key public health leaders, to offering confusing and conflicting 
guidance on infection-control procedures – the current US administration has 
failed to demonstrate effective leadership.133
At global level, the US has declined to take a leading role in the collective effort 
to fight COVID-19. At times, too, the Trump administration’s interventions have 
been antagonistic and counterproductive. Nowhere has this been more striking 
than in its response to China. While there are legitimate questions about the 
Chinese government’s early reporting of the outbreak, including whether it was 
fully transparent and timely in transmitting information about the impact, scope 
and origins of the outbreak, Trump’s personal response has been to vilify and 
alienate the Chinese government. Even before the pandemic, he withdrew CDC 
staff from the country, and cut funding for research collaboration with researchers 
in Wuhan, hamstringing its best sources of intelligence and mitigation.134
The US appears to have turned its back on its international partners, too, as 
signalled not least through its efforts to buy up the world’s supply of remdesivir 
and its suggestion that it will not partner internationally on vaccine distribution. 
This isolationist response to the pandemic, also evident in its conspicuous 
absence from the Access to COVID-19 Tools ACT-Accelerator – a multinational 
collaboration between public and private institutions, launched in April 2020, 
to expedite the development, production and provision of fair access to COVID-19 
diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines135 – doesn’t just cause resentment among 
the US’s long-time allies. It also crucially fails to acknowledge the US’s own 
dependence on the success of a global endeavour to counter the transnational 
threat from COVID-19.
Of even greater concern is the Trump administration’s formal instigation, in July 
2020, of the process of withdrawing the US from WHO.136 The US is at present the 
biggest donor to WHO – providing about 15 per cent of the organization’s total 
budget – and has contributed to major initiatives including the agency’s emergency 
health operations.137 In isolation, the US itself does not have the capability or the 
reach that would allow it to unilaterally monitor emerging infectious diseases, 




135 World Health Organization (2020), ‘The Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator’, https://www.who.int/
initiatives/act-accelerator (accessed 16 Aug 2020).
136 U.S. Department of State (2020), ‘Update on U.S. Withdrawal from the World Health Organization’, 
3 September 2020, https://www.state.gov/update-on-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-world-health-organization 
(accessed 27 Sept 2020).
137 World Health Organization (2020), ‘Assessed contributions overview for all Member States as at 30 June 2020’, 
https://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/AC_Status_Report_2020.pdf?ua=1 
(accessed 3 Aug. 2020).
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or to influence their management, yet COVID-19 has shown, on a shocking scale, 
how susceptible US public health is to the spread of infectious diseases originating 
beyond its borders. Withdrawing from WHO, even if legally possible, without 
offering a meaningful alternative to coordinate global efforts to tackle infectious 
diseases leaves the US considerably more vulnerable with regard to this outbreak 
and the attendant consequences.138
The global health agenda for 
the next administration
If there is a Biden administration, it will take office likely while the country is 
still in the throes of managing the response to COVID-19. There will be immediate 
opportunities for leadership, both domestically in getting the virus under control 
in the US, and in global stewardship of mitigation efforts. Both scenarios could 
bring into stark relief the longer-term impacts of neglecting under-resourced 
communities and countries in terms of fostering sustainable economic and 
global stability.
It will not be enough for the next administration to recommit to the baseline 
standards of its predecessors. Too much valuable ground has already been lost. 
To avoid further harm to US economic and public health, the next president must 
not only re-establish its starting position at the end of the Obama administration, 
but also look for opportunities to lead in building a comprehensive global response 
to the pandemic – and to shore up its position for the next pandemic, when 
it inevitably comes.
In the first instance, the administration must significantly increase funding and 
political prioritization of its domestic and global health response to COVID-19. 
The US ultimately relies on a global economy. Even if the virus is contained in the US, 
if it is still raging in key supplier markets, and if travel remains severely disrupted, 
the US economy will continue to suffer. Furthermore, the social and economic 
impacts of COVID-19 could further destabilize more vulnerable countries, leading 
to increased migration, extremism, hunger and corruption. Leading a coalition 
of willing and well-funded partners, in the public and private sectors, to mitigate 
the impact of the disease is key to the US recovery. The US should not only invest 
in the ACT-Accelerator; it needs to become a leader in this public–private partner 
effort. Both as part of the accelerator and multilaterally, it should work with 
138 Gaulkin, T (2020), ‘Pandemic failure or convenient scapegoat? How did WHO get here?’, Bulletin of the  
Atomic Scientists, 9 July 2020, https://thebulletin.org/2020/07/pandemic-failure-or-convenient-scapegoat- 
how-did-who-get-here (accessed 16 Aug. 2020).
Leading a coalition of willing and well-funded partners, 
in the public and private sectors, to mitigate the impact 
of COVID-19 is key to US recovery.
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partners on protocols around resuming international travel and appropriate border 
controls, building best practices for testing and tracing new outbreaks, and for 
distribution of key supplies, medical counter-measures and vaccines.
Second, the president must recommit to US investment in the key multilateral 
organizations – including WHO – so that it is better prepared for the next outbreak. 
The administration should ensure that there is an unflinching assessment of key 
lessons learned; but the answer is to reform, not to walk away. The US must 
ensure that its seat on the WHO executive board is not only swiftly filled, but filled 
by someone with suitable credibility and expertise. It should marshal like-minded 
countries to evaluate whether the WHO reforms of recent years have gone far 
enough. It should work to ensure WHO has the authority and the resources that 
mean that the organization has sufficient independence to act in the best interests 
of global public health, and that its recommendations are not compromised by 
politics. And it should re-energize and recommit to its role in leading the Global 
Health Security Agenda and ensuring that countries continue to subject themselves 
to rigorous external evaluation. The US should not try to unilaterally ‘own’ a global 
response to the pandemic – nor could it – but it should provide leadership and 
resources to a common agenda that will protect its own citizens and economy.
Finally, the administration should look to some of the lessons learned from 9/11. 
It was clear from the attacks that US government agencies had failed to take 
seriously a series of factors that clearly signalled the likelihood of a major attack 
against the US mainland. President George W. Bush and Congress commissioned 
an in-depth report and analysis, led by a bipartisan and well-respected group of 
experts and political leaders, which set out a roadmap for reform that remains 
relevant today. The next administration should commit to a similar process, including 
by re-evaluating the existing bureaucracies, funding, border screening and global 
partnerships. It must then commit to implementing these recommendations.
There is no question that when it comes to health security and pandemic 
preparedness, COVID-19 is not the end of the story. The US must be prepared 
for whatever next comes its way. The only effective strategy is to reverse the 
isolationist and antagonistic approach of the last four years, and instead lead 








The next administration will need to work to restore the 
tools of US soft power in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
including a more humane approach on immigration.
Christopher Sabatini
The last two decades have seen significant shifts, and expansion, in Latin America’s 
diplomatic, economic and political diversity and agency relative to US influence, 
and, with it, increasing diplomatic and political fragmentation across the Americas. 
Successive elections have brought to power governments with differing affinities – 
and sometimes outright antipathy – towards the US. At the same time, the 
economic growth of China, India and other countries of the Global South has 
helped spur economic growth and diversify export markets for most of the countries 
of South America, and to a lesser extent for Central America and Mexico.
The question for the next US administration – whether under Donald Trump 
or Joe Biden – is the extent to which the US’s leadership style and content 
can influence Latin America and the Caribbean’s future challenges and global 
orientation, or the extent to which they are determined by structural conditions 
and momentum, as well as domestic political dynamics.
Many of the relevant issues of economic and political development have 
been brought into sharper relief as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the accompanying economic nosedive in the Americas. As early as June 2020, 
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the IMF was forecasting that the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 
would together contract by 9.3 per cent this year, before – in a seemingly 
optimistic scenario – returning to growth of around 3.7 per cent growth in 2021.139 
The pandemic, and the policy responses of recent months, will have wiped 
out the region’s economic gains of the past decade, and reversed the fortunes 
of many – including the estimated 50 million citizens who joined the middle 
class during that time.140
The next US administration can serve as an essential partner in helping the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean rebuild their economies and calm the possible 
social and political turmoil fuelled by the crisis. A critical step would be for it to 
lead an international response to the looming public debt crisis, stemming from 
the aggressive stimulus packages that many of the region’s governments have 
launched: the costs of the stimulus measures announced by Peru at the end of 
March 2020, for instance, are equivalent to some 12 per cent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP).141
Why things are different
The traditional tools of US–Latin American relations no longer have the same 
heft. They have been weakened by shifts in US domestic politics and a politically 
divided, changing region. Trade has traditionally been a bipartisan means to build 
closer relations in the Americas. But this has changed with the growth in resistance 
to trade within the Republican Party base – whereas historically that resistance has 
come from the Democratic Party’s labour wing – and been captured politically by 
the Trump administration.
During the 2016 election campaign, Donald Trump called the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ‘the worst trade deal ever’,142 and denounced 
the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiated under the Obama 
administration. Immediately on reaching the White House, Trump withdrew the 
US from the TPP and set about renegotiating NAFTA – often using threats of selective 
tariffs or a unilateral withdrawal to force a trade deal more favourable to his 
‘America First’ agenda. The eventual United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement 
(USMCA), signed in December 2019, upgraded NAFTA’s provisions on labour 
protection and updated those on technology and intellectual property. The Trump 
administration has also used trade sanctions on Argentina, Brazil and Canada 
to protect US steel and/or aluminum.
139 Kristalina, G. (2020), ‘A Joint Response for Latin America and the Caribbean to Counter the COVID-19 Crisis’, 
International Monetary Fund, 24 June 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/24/sp06242
0-a-joint-response-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-to-counter-the-covid-19-crisis (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
140 The World Bank (2012), ‘Latin America Middle Class hits Historic High’, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
feature/2012/11/13/crecimiento-clase-media-america-latina (accessed 22 Sept. 2020). United Nations (2020), 
‘Policy Brief: The Impact of COVID-19 on Latin America and the Caribbean’, July 2020, https://www.un.org/sites/ 
un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_covid_lac.pdf (accessed 22 Sept. 2020).
141 Quigley, J. (2020), ‘Peru Tackles Virus with Region’s Biggest Stimulus, Eyes IMF Help’, Bloomberg News, 
30 March 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-30/peru-drawing-up-economic-stimulus- 
package-equal-to-12-of-gdp (accessed 22 Sept. 2020).
142 BBC News (2016), ‘Nafta: ‘Single worst trade deal ever approved’’, 27 September 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
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The vocal and organized resistance to free trade that now spans both Democrats 
and Republicans in Congress means that, while the style of US trade policy may vary 
according to who sits in the White House over the next four years, the substance 
is unlikely to change much. A Biden administration – should there be one – isn’t 
about to rush into new trade deals in the Americas, or globally.
A predictable and humane approach to immigration – and immigration reform – 
has long been important in the exercise of US regional soft power. But while, under 
a change of administration, better treatment of immigrants and a decisive move 
away from negative rhetoric on migrants, particularly those from Mexico and 
Central America, would go some way towards restoring more positive perceptions 
of the US in Latin America and the Caribbean, the prospects of comprehensive 
immigration reform in the short term are dim.
After the failed efforts at immigration reform under the administrations of 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Donald Trump and his supporters have 
built a national, organized platform for anti-immigrant sentiment that will 
not easily be dismantled. When, in June 2015, Trump rode down his gilded 
escalator to announce his bid for the presidency, he spoke of Mexican immigrants 
as ‘rapists’ and violent criminals, pledging to build a wall along the US–Mexico 
border. In doing so, he not only placed immigration at the centre of US political 
debate, but also made US partisan politics intrinsic to regional policymaking.
Many Latin American and Caribbean governments, and their citizens, regard US 
attitudes and policies towards immigrants as central to US claims of ‘partnership’, 
the term often used by US diplomats to further the country’s objectives in the region. 
Largely because of Trump’s stance on immigration, and negative perceptions of his 
wider foreign policy, public support for the US president has sunk to historically 
low levels in the region under the present administration. The Pew Research 
Center’s Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey, published in January 2020, showed 
that just 8 per cent of Mexicans had confidence in Donald Trump to ‘do the right 
thing regarding world affairs’ – the lowest approval rating of all 32 countries 
surveyed. Confidence in Trump’s handling of foreign affairs also remained low 
in Brazil, at 28 per cent, and Argentina, at 22 per cent, although there had been 
an appreciable increase in support in these countries since 2018, from 16 per cent 
and 11 per cent respectively.143
Under a potential Biden administration, policies instituted under the Trump 
presidency – such as family separation, the housing of asylum seekers outside the 
US,144 and the suspension of temporary protected status (TPS)145 – can be expected 
to be reversed, and there will likely be greater investment in development in 
sending countries. These changes may help rebuild a reserve of goodwill and soft 
power in the region, but the effects of the vocal anti-immigrant sentiment that has 
taken hold in US public debate will be much harder, or even impossible, to erase.
143 Pew Research Center (2020), ‘Confidence in Trump remains low internationally’, 7 January 2020, p. 18, 
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144 O’Toole, M. and Gomez, M. (2020), ‘Trump and Biden on immigration: nearly opposite, but not quite’, 
17 August 2020, Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-08-17/trump-biden- 
immigration-policy (accessed 22 Sept. 2020).
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Alongside the Trump administration’s grandstanding and punitive policies 
on immigration and trade have come assertive actions to isolate and punish the 
Cuban and Venezuelan regimes and to warn of China’s increasing presence in 
the region. Early in his presidency, Trump moved to roll back some aspects of his 
predecessor’s easing of the US Cuba embargo by limiting flights and cruises to 
the island, forbidding US travellers from staying in state-owned hotels once 
there,146 and reducing the dollar amounts Cuban-Americans could send to family 
and friends in Cuba. The Trump administration also ramped up pressure on the 
government of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, at first using the provisions developed 
under the Obama administration to increase targeted sanctions on individuals and 
impose financial sanctions on state entities. When, in January 2019, Venezuela’s 
National Assembly voted to endorse its speaker, Juan Guaidó, as the country’s 
interim president (Maduro’s re-election in 2018 being regarded by Venezuela’s 
opposition and much of the international community as illegitimate), the Trump 
administration, along with more than 50 other governments, quickly recognized 
Guaidó as head of state. To pressure Maduro to step aside, the White House 
stepped up measures against his regime, imposing an embargo on US trade (with 
humanitarian exceptions) with Venezuelan state entities, principal among them 
the oil company PDVSA and the oil refiner and retailer CITGO. While the measures 
against Cuba were largely taken unilaterally by the US, its pressure on Venezuela 
has been more aligned with the responses of a coalition of governments in Latin 
America and Europe, although it has gone further in terms of sanctions than other 
countries, collectively or individually.
Over the past four years, one of the Trump administration’s top-line narratives 
in policymaking towards Latin America and the Caribbean has been the challenge 
from China’s involvement in the region. Indeed, over the last two decades China 
has substantially increased its economic influence in Latin America: it has become 
a leading trade partner for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru; and a major lender 
and investor in the oil sectors of Venezuela and Ecuador, and in agriculture in 
Argentina and Brazil. Even with the rapid increase in China’s economic footprint 
in the region, official bilateral lending by China represents just 6 per cent of 
public debt in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to Rebecca Ray 
and Kevin Gallagher of Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.147 
But with economic engagement has come increased diplomatic activity: Panama, 
El Salvador and the Dominican Republic have all switched diplomatic recognition 
from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China in the last decade. Educational 
exchanges have also increased, as has China’s state media presence in the region.
Many of these ties are for the long term, and China’s engagement in the region 
is likely to increase in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic – although perhaps 
not to the alarming degree implied by the Trump administration. China can still 
146 Sherman, A. (2020), ‘Trump has largely kept promise to reverse Obama’s Cuba policy’, Politifact, 15 July 2020, 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/promise/1378/reverse-barack-obamas-cuba-
policy (accessed 22 Sept. 2020).
147 Ray, R. and Gallagher, K. (2020), ‘China alone can’t solve Latin America’s looming debt crisis’, 5 August 2020, 
Boston University Global Development Policy Center, https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/china-debt-relief- 
cant-solve-latin-america-debt-crisis (accessed 22 Sept. 2020).
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offer much-needed investment in infrastructure, and while demand has slumped 
during 2020, China will continue to be an important market for the commodity 
exports on which the economies of Latin America depend.
The diplomatic and economic tussles and threats that have characterized 
US–Chinese relations over the past four years are unlikely to come to a halt under 
a potential Biden administration – even though they may become less public 
and be expressed rather differently. The risk remains that regional relations 
will become entangled in a wider geopolitical competition that goes beyond the 
warnings and largely symbolic blandishments witnessed so far. Latin American 
and Caribbean governments may find themselves increasingly pressured to take 
the US side by actively placing restrictions on Chinese investment and reducing 
participation in Chinese diplomatic initiatives.
As regards Venezuela, Juan Guaidó has been recognized as the constitutional 
interim president by mainstream Republicans and Democrats alike. Policies 
towards the Maduro regime are thus unlikely to change dramatically under 
a second term for Trump, or in the event of a Biden administration. The latter, 
however, may be expected to show a greater public commitment to international 
cooperation in the application of sanctions – and where appropriate their easing – 
as a central pillar of its Venezuela policy.
Where a Biden administration would be expected to diverge significantly from its 
predecessor is over the Cuba embargo. A Biden White House would likely move 
quickly to reverse the travel restrictions and the downgrading of the US diplomatic 
mission in Havana imposed by the Trump administration, and coordinate more 
closely with other governments and multilateral blocs – such as Canada, the EU and 
the UK – on Cuba’s human rights record. A complete end to the embargo is unlikely, 
however, since the required act of Congress would not be expected to be a priority.
The road to a second term for Donald Trump lies through the state of Florida, 
and its dwindling but still important hardline Cuban-American community and 
Venezuelan-American expatriates. The president’s campaign advisers recognize 
that his return to the White House depends on winning the state’s 29 electoral 
votes – as is evident from the Trump administration’s frequent choice of South 
Florida as the place from which to make policy pronouncements on Latin America. 
Should Trump secure re-election, he will have policy debts to pay to South Florida 
voters, who will demand an even tougher focus on Cuba and Venezuela.
The risk remains that regional relations will become 
entangled in a wider geopolitical competition that 
goes beyond the warnings and largely symbolic 
blandishments witnessed so far.
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What can be done?
Whoever is in the White House after 20 January 2021, they will find US policy 
objectives as regards Latin America constrained by a number of factors. Many 
are difficult, and some impossible, to influence or recast. Either administration 
will need to operate in the context of the ongoing cycle of elections across the 
region that will, in the natural progression of politics, bring to power governments 
of different ideological orientations and policy agendas, internationally and 
domestically; the economic, social and political fallout from the COVID-19 
pandemic; and the continuing expansion of China’s economic and diplomatic 
global influence.
Nevertheless, leadership – both in style and substance – can help shape some 
processes and outcomes in ways that are more favourable to US national interests, 
and that can help support economic and political development in the Americas, as 
well as promote broader global public goods. And the next administration should 
look beyond a bilateral US–Latin America relationship: many of the areas set out 
below should be looked on as points of collaboration with other partners, including 
the EU, the UK, Asian allies, and – in some instances – China.
An important first step is for the US to restore its tools of soft power. One critical 
aspect here is immigration. A more balanced, humane approach to immigration 
policy – one that shows empathy towards the difficult decisions made by people 
to leave their home countries and families – will help build a deeper reserve 
of support for US policy, and influence regional governments’ willingness 
to cooperate across a range of issues.
Next, while the downgrading of new trade agreements across the world may mean 
that this long-standing tool of US regional cooperation may temporarily be set 
aside, there are other important areas of common interest that can be leveraged 
over the next four years. Latin Americans’ shared concerns over matters of security 
and crime, as well as climate change, are potential points of partnership that 
the next administration can pursue with governments in the region. On climate, 
recommitting the US to the Paris Agreement is key, but this should not be an end 
in itself: US and regional engagement will be critical to addressing issues of food 
security, infectious diseases and economic instability arising from climate change. 
Shepherding multilateral efforts to build up funds for climate change adaptation 
targeting at-risk communities, and working in partnership with Latin American 
state and non-state actors in global forums, will help build regional goodwill. 
And an essential objective must be to persuade Brazil to re-engage in global 
efforts on climate change mitigation, and stem the destruction of environmental 
resources and disavowal of climate change cooperation under the administration 
of Jair Bolsonaro.
Shared concerns over matters of security and 
crime, as well as climate change, are potential points 
of partnership that the next administration can 
pursue with governments in the region.
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A third element would be to restore full US engagement with Latin America and 
the Caribbean via established regional multilateral forums such as the Organization 
of the American States and the Summits of Americas Process. A notable opportunity 
now lies in the US’s presidency of the latter, effective from July 2020, and its 
scheduled hosting of the ninth triennial summit in 2021. The Trump administration 
has been absent from, or has sent lower-level representatives to, major summits, 
including the annual Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly; 
and the last Summit of the Americas, hosted by Peru in 2018, was attended by 
Vice-President Mike Pence after Trump himself withdrew. Those absences may 
have undercut early White House efforts to secure a unanimous vote to condemn 
the Maduro government under the OAS’s democracy clause, and to elect 
a US candidate to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.148 The Trump 
administration has also been antagonistic towards the OAS’s Inter-American 
System of Human Rights, and has cut funding to that body.149
Perceptions of US disregard for the interests of Latin American governments 
and citizens, as well as for the main forums for regional engagement, even if not 
fully justified, have undoubtedly limited the potential for collaboration on issues 
of regional and global importance. A fresh embrace of regional multilateral 
institutions and collaborative work with Latin American partners could promote 
goodwill and mutually beneficial cooperation, regardless of who occupies the 
White House over the next four years. Restoring the US’s full financial commitments 
to the OAS and the Inter-American System of Human Rights will help reinforce 
both bodies’ legitimacy and authority. Over the past decade, regional divisions and 
political polarization have weakened these institutions’ effectiveness, and this will 
not easily be reversed. But US leadership can do much to restore their credibility 
and shore up their role as a platform for collective problem-solving and a forceful 
advocate for human rights.
US leadership can also help maintain the relevance of the international and regional 
financial institutions – such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank – by reforming and working with Latin American and Caribbean 
governments during and after the COVID-19 pandemic to rebuild economies and 
reduce poverty and rising inequality exacerbated by the economic contraction. 
Addressing long-standing structural weaknesses in markets – including labour 
148 Camilleri, M. (2017), ‘What does defeat at OAS meeting portend for U.S. influence in the Americas?’, Global 
Americans, 17 June 2017, https://theglobalamericans.org/2017/06/defeat-oas-meeting-portend-us-influence-
americas (accessed 30 Sept. 2020).
149 Sabatini, C. (2020), ‘Why is the U.S. joining Venezuela and Nicaragua in discrediting a system to protect 
human rights?’, Washington Post, 17 January 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/01/17/
why-is-us-joining-venezuela-nicaragua-discrediting-system-protect-human-rights (accessed 18 Aug. 2020).
A fresh embrace of regional multilateral institutions 
and collaborative work with Latin American partners 
could promote goodwill and mutually beneficial 
cooperation, regardless of who occupies the White 
House over the next four years.
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markets – and reinforcing social safety nets are important factors in allaying social 
discontent in the region that may threaten democratic governments and political 
stability and security.
Fourth, the US needs to recover a non-polarizing consensus in its foreign policy and 
bilateral relations on human rights and democracy. This means maintaining a focus 
on Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, while not disregarding other countries – among 
them Bolivia, Brazil and Honduras – where there is troubling evidence of the erosion 
of democratic norms and a coarsening of human rights standards. A consistent 
approach will be all the more important if even greater polarization of societies 
and undermining of democratic institutions are to be avoided in the aftermath of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Protecting and promoting connections and collaboration 
among non-state actors – including civil society, academic exchange and business – 
will also help strengthen the consensus around policy towards Latin America 
and the Caribbean.
Last, it should not be regarded as inevitable that the US’s global competition 
with China will spill over into relations south of the border. Rather than confront 
China’s rise and growing presence in the region as a zero-sum threat, the next US 
administration will need to look for ways to collaborate with Beijing in matters 
such as infrastructure investment, climate change and trade opening. Instead 
of simply warning or berating governments in Latin America and the Caribbean 
about the negative consequences of Chinese influence, any future administration 
needs to offer a more attractive alternative, economically, diplomatically and 
financially. Part of this demands restoring the US’s moral authority on matters of 
corruption, immigration, human rights and multilateral cooperation. In matters 
of trade, infrastructure investment, and climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
there is plenty of scope for collaboration that can build goodwill at the very 




A values-based  
US foreign policy?
A renewed focus on values will present difficult trade-offs for 
the next administration, but demonstrating consistency in its 
approach to democracy and human rights will be critical.
Leslie Vinjamuri
Donald Trump entered the White House determined to scale back 
the US’s international commitments and embrace a more assertive, 
transactional approach to foreign policy, one that put ‘America First’. 
One side-effect of this has been the downgrading of support for 
democracy and human rights in US foreign policy – and as a shared 
priority with its long-standing allies. Over time, though, his 
administration has increased its use of human rights-based sanctions, 
albeit in a highly selective manner. In its most important geopolitical 
relationship, with China, the president’s transactional approach has 
gradually given ground as his administration – especially Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo – and also Congress narrow in on the anti-
democratic ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and its violations 
of human rights. The ‘values turn’ in US foreign policy looks likely 
to continue regardless of the outcome of November’s presidential 
election, even if singling out President Xi Jinping and the Communist 
Party does not. This will create a series of foreign policy dilemmas for 
the next administration that, if not carefully managed, could set back 
the prospects of any easing of tensions between the US and China.
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A selective embrace of democracy 
and human rights
The Trump administration has worn its ambivalence to human rights on its sleeve, 
but Washington’s selective embrace of democracy and human rights has a long 
history. Under Bill Clinton’s presidency, the US failed to heed warnings of genocide 
in Rwanda, but intervened (late) in the conflict in Bosnia to force all parties to the 
negotiating table and bring an end to ethnic cleansing by Bosnia’s Serbian 
leaders.150 Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, under the administration 
of George W. Bush, the US’s global reputation was severely harmed as evidence 
emerged that the US government had authorized the use of torture tactics against 
prisoners held at Abu Ghraib.151 By the time Barack Obama took office in 2009, 
democracy promotion had become tainted by its association with the violent 
disorder that had followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein and regime change in 
Iraq. In 2011 the US agreed to the NATO-led intervention in Libya’s civil war. 
However, the ensuing descent into chaos meant that the US grew increasingly wary 
of calls to use military force to intervene in sovereign states for the purposes of 
protecting civilians. In 2013 Obama threatened to respond with military force if 
Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people. 
But when Assad proceeded to cross this stated ‘red line’, Obama did not follow 
through. The decision not to enforce the red line came to be seen by many as his 
defining foreign policy failure.152
Under President Trump’s leadership, the US has stepped away from multilateral 
cooperation on human rights. It withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council 
in 2018, a decision that recalled George W. Bush’s opposition to the body’s 
establishment in 2006.153 The Trump administration has also stepped up its attacks 
on the International Criminal Court (ICC), a court that the US has never joined 
but which, under the Obama administration, it had supported. In June 2020, 
in response to the Court’s investigation of alleged abuses by US service personnel in 
the conflict in Afghanistan, President Trump issued an executive order authorizing 
asset freezes and imposing family entry bans not on the alleged perpetrators of 
150 Power, S. (2002), A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Basic Books.
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war crimes, but on ICC officials. Most recently, in September, the US government 
announced that it had designated ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and 
another official from the Office of the Prosecutor for sanctions.154
Trump has reasserted America’s sovereignty and been selective in his support 
for human rights, especially where he has sought to forge deals with autocrats. The 
fact that little has come of the president’s pursuit of these trademark deals has not 
deterred him. He has boasted that he gets along well with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, 
but over the last four years Washington’s relationship with Moscow has 
deteriorated. The US has withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty; it maintains the sanctions against Russia imposed in response 
to the annexation of Crimea in 2014; and warnings remain of Russian attempts to 
interfere in the 2020 US presidential election.155 In his on-again, off-again dealings 
with Kim Jong-un, Trump turned a blind eye to North Korea’s well-documented 
human rights abuses;156 but his summit diplomacy has not brought about the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Trump has openly acknowledged that 
he refrained from imposing human rights sanctions against China for its practice 
of forcibly detaining Uighurs in camps because he did not want to undermine 
trade talks with Beijing.157 But the phase-one agreement reached in January 2020 
has done little to alter China’s trade practices; and China has not thus far met its 
commitment to increase purchases of US goods in line with the terms of the deal. 
Where the Trump administration has emphasized human rights, it has done so 
very selectively. That the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded 
under the Obama administration expressly did not address human rights abuses in 
Iran was one of the reasons given by Trump to withdraw the US from the deal. But 
under his administration, the US has continued to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia, 
and has provided logistical support to the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen 
that has killed thousands of civilians, despite bipartisan congressional pressure 
to end US involvement in the conflict.158 And, it has been cautious in its approach 
to sanctioning the Saudi regime for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi 
at the kingdom’s consulate in Istanbul in October 2018. (In the following month 
the US imposed sanctions on 17 Saudi officials, the most senior of these being 
a former close adviser to the crown prince.159)
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In 2017 Trump was swift to congratulate Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
on the outcome of the national referendum that gave the head of state sweeping 
new constitutional powers. And in forging a connection with President Rodrigo 
Duterte of the Philippines, he has turned a blind eye to the killings committed in 
the latter’s war on illegal drugs.
But, despite President Trump’s attempts to be purely transactional, his 
administration has increasingly made human rights promotion a foreign policy 
priority. For this, sanctions have been the instrument of choice. Sanctions have 
served multiple purposes: they signal moral opprobrium and can be costly for 
those on the receiving end, but in many cases sanctions have also served as 
a substitute for stronger measures to stop human rights abuses. By the end of 2019 
at least 190 individuals and entities had been sanctioned under the authority of the 
Global Magnitsky Act, passed by Congress in 2016, with 96 targeted in that year 
alone.160 In June 2020, more than nine years after the onset of civil war in Syria, 
and more than 500,000 deaths, the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into 
force.161 The US has since imposed a series of new sanctions, drawing on this and 
other Syria-related sanctions authorities, on government officials and business 
leaders linked to the Assad regime.162 And in October the US again resorted to 
sanctions, this time targeting eight Belarusian officials in connection with the 
fraudulent re-election of Aliaksandr Lukashenka and the subsequent violent 
crackdown on protesters.163 
China and the turn to values in US 
foreign policymaking
The most consequential shift in the Trump administration’s focus on values has 
been in its policy towards China. Over the past several months, US policy discourse 
has focused in on China’s domestic human rights abuses against the Uighur 
population who have been placed in ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang, its repression 
of democracy in Hong Kong, and – significantly – on the Chinese Communist Party 
and its alleged role in perpetuating these human rights abuses.164 The hardening 
of public attitudes in the context of the coronavirus pandemic has also paved the 
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way for a harder line on China. Polling during the summer of 2020 found that 
73 per cent of Americans held an unfavourable view of China.165 This creates the 
prospect of a broad-spectrum confrontation with China.
Several factors have drawn America’s focus increasingly towards China, and 
especially towards its use of surveillance technology and repression of human 
rights. As China’s share of the world economy has grown, and competition between 
the US and China has heated up, the prospect that geopolitical rivalry would spill 
over to include fundamental differences related to ideology and values has been 
considerable. Even before Trump was elected, US officials had become acutely 
aware of the potential challenge China poses to US influence. Great powers exert 
a unique influence on international politics, and part of this influence is a product 
of the domestic values that are reflected through their external engagement.
Some analysts and former officials, among them Thomas Christensen and Kurt M. 
Campbell, have argued convincingly that a Cold War analogy is not the right one 
for understanding the US–China confrontation, but that China’s particular form 
of authoritarianism will nonetheless exert a pull towards autocracy.166 Christensen 
argues that China’s attempts to undermine democracy have been limited to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, both areas that China claims as part of its territory. China’s 
exports of facial recognition technologies and training of foreign powers in 
surveillance technologies could strengthen authoritarian states, he argues, but 
the fact that China has not attempted to undermine other democracies is a key 
factor that differentiates the increasingly ideological confrontation between the US 
and China from that between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.167 
But even if China does not seek to alter the internal character of other 
democracies, the sheer fact of its global influence in international and regional 
institutions has meant that China’s values are increasingly prominent in 
international affairs. Campbell, too, has argued that China’s fusion of authoritarian 
capitalism and digital surveillance will mean that the international system is pulled 
towards autocracy. For this reason, values should remain a focus of US foreign 
policy, especially in its dealings with China.
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China currently heads four of the 15 specialized agencies of the UN, and it also 
exerts significant influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Few apart from the most careful US 
China-watchers differentiate between these last two institutions. And the fact that 
the AIIB is broadly aligned with Western standards for international development 
assistance has been overshadowed by the widely held perception, particularly in 
the West, that China is pursuing ‘debt diplomacy’ through the BRI and fostering 
a form of dependence on the part of borrowing states.
Other factors have also paved the way for a new US focus on China’s authoritarian 
values. Chief among these is the emergence, during the Trump administration, of 
a bipartisan consensus on the need to take a tougher line on China. The foundation 
for this consensus was initially forged around the shared belief that China had 
failed to comply with international rules on trade, that it was stealing intellectual 
property, and that it was not playing by the same rules as the US and Europe on 
the critical matter of subsidies to state-owned enterprises.168 This consensus has 
over time given rise to a more comprehensive focus on the nature of the challenge 
that China presents in international politics. During Trump’s first term, the US has 
drawn attention to China’s surveillance state.169 The national security threat that 
Chinese technology companies present to Western democracies and the individual 
privacy rights of their citizens has taken centre stage in US policy discussions on 
China. Washington has effectively disputed, too, Beijing’s assertion that these 
companies are independent from the Chinese Communist Party.170
The COVID-19 crisis has further accelerated tensions between the US and China. 
The widespread perception that Chinese authorities had withheld information 
about the coronavirus in the early stages of its discovery in late 2019 quickly 
became politicized in a US domestic environment marked by President Trump’s 
initial denial of the pandemic and his subsequent catastrophic mishandling of the 
US coronavirus response.171 Trump has further stoked tensions between the US 
and China over the past months, including through his references to COVID-19 
as ‘the China virus’, in what critics see as an attempt to deflect attention from 
the scale of the ongoing crisis in the US.172
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Meanwhile, China’s imposition of the Hong Kong National Security Law at 
the end of June 2020 triggered a backlash from the US and the UK in particular. 
And reports of the detention of at least 1 million Uighurs in detention camps 
in Xinjiang have all contributed to a hardening of US public and elite attitudes 
towards China.173 
US political scrutiny of China has thus intensified in the months leading up to 
the US presidential election. In June 2020, Congress coalesced around a human 
rights agenda, passing legislation authorizing sanctions against Chinese officials 
for the detention and mass surveillance of Uighurs.174 Congress also approved 
the removal of Hong Kong’s special economic status, and imposed individual 
sanctions on key individuals through the Hong Kong Autonomy Act.175 Perhaps 
the most consequential shift has been the Trump administration’s focus on China’s 
Communist Party. This was evident in Secretary Pompeo’s speech at the Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library in July, in which he narrowed in on the national security 
threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.176 
What lies ahead
A central challenge for a return to a values-based US foreign policy will be the 
need for the next administration to demonstrate consistency in its approach 
to human rights. 
This will be difficult to achieve at a time when democracy is in retreat among 
some of the US’s most important strategic partners. India is one such example.177 
As tension between the US and China increases, India’s strategic importance to the 
US will continue to grow. But India’s own backsliding on democracy is concerning: 
notably it dropped 10 places, to 51, in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy 
Index for 2019.178 It is important that the next US administration is rigorous in 
its naming of democratic regression and attacks on individual rights. It should, 
though, also devise a principled but pragmatic strategy for promoting human 
rights that seeks to integrate clear incentives for reform in its diplomacy.
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The first step is to develop a clear strategy that relies on well-established 
practices for identifying human rights violations. The US will need to evaluate 
carefully how to insert human rights discourse into its diplomacy. It should seek 
to avoid the kind of costly escalation of tit-for-tat sanctions that it has experienced 
with China, and which have revealed the absence of a clear strategy for sequencing 
diplomacy and human rights sanctions.
In its policy towards China, the US should focus specifically on policies and 
behaviours that violate established universal human rights standards, rather than 
more broadly on the ideology of China’s Communist Party. This provides a better 
way forward because it makes it possible to designate the conditions under which 
sanctions will be lifted. It also guards against the risk of being drawn into 
intractable and costly ideological confrontation.
The next US administration will also need to re-evaluate its multilateral 
commitments. Renewing the US commitment to international engagement is 
important both symbolically and practically. As presidential candidate, 
Joe Biden has proposed convening a ‘summit of democracies’, and one of the 
key objectives is for the world’s leading democracies to coordinate their strategies 
for managing China’s rise. Similarly, the UK government has proposed a ‘D-10’ 
grouping of democracies, to include the G7 plus South Korea, India and Australia, 
to focus on issues like 5G and on securing supply chains, in a clear response to the 
challenge presented by tensions with China.
The opportunity to work with like-minded groups of states is compelling, 
especially in an uncertain and competitive global context. But pursuing multilateral 
forums of this kind should be balanced against the risk that doing so will alienate 
and antagonize states that find themselves excluded. Reassuring those outside such 
frameworks that the intention is to enhance rather than diminish the prospects 
for broader cooperation will be essential. Groupings of democracies may serve as 
an important part of an overall strategy, but these should be pursued alongside 
inclusive multilateral institutions. The latter are also essential for managing the 
most pressing global concerns – whether the protection of human rights or tackling 
the demands around climate change, international trade and technology policy, 
and public health.
Regardless who sits in the White House over the coming four years, the next 
stage of US global engagement is likely to see a renewed focus on values. A robust 
and articulate embrace of democracy and human rights would be welcomed 
by America’s allies and also by many civil society organizations in states where 
democracy is receding, and would send a strong signal to adversaries as well as 
allies that the US is ‘back’.
Regardless who sits in the White House over the coming 
four years, the next stage of US global engagement is 
likely to see a renewed focus on values.
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As human rights and democracy are elevated in US foreign policy, this will also 
lead to intense scrutiny of the US’s record at home. So it is critical that the next 
administration should seek to rebuild unity, address racial injustice and reduce 
deep-rooted inequalities among its own citizens. The failure to do this will bolster 
charges of hypocrisy, and further compromise the US’s global standing and 
influence in the years ahead. As always, foreign policy begins at home.
Concluding thoughts
Structural change in the international system compels America to think in new 
ways about its role in the world. The US is now confronted by a rising China whose 
political system and domestic values diverge radically from its own, and from those 
of many of its closest democratic partners and allies. This creates a potentially 
dangerous and challenging environment at a time when the need to find forward-
looking solutions for common global challenges is urgent.
It is imperative that the US work closely with its European partners, and that 
it extend this cooperation beyond the transatlantic space to also include other 
democracies that will be critical in managing China’s rise, especially Japan, South 
Korea, India and Australia. This is both necessary and fitting in a world where 
power is diffused but challenges are global and the upholding of shared values 
is vital. Ensuring that liberal values are fully integrated and clearly articulated 
is essential, and this will require the US and its democratic partners to hold each 
other accountable on these values. But this must happen alongside efforts to 
achieve internationally agreed goals on climate change, to recommit to multilateral 
cooperation on health, and to ensure sustainable and inclusive global growth.  
It will also be critical that the US works closely with its democratic partners to 
devise and enable realistic, attractive and competitive alternatives to help meet 
the security and economic needs of states and peoples across the Middle East, Latin 
America and Africa. Success on this dimension will depend, vitally, on the ability 
of the US and its democratic partners to offer and enable realistic and effective 
alternatives that also reflect the standards and values they embrace at home.
Managing these global challenges will have a critical impact on national 
and international peace, security and prosperity. These are not neutral domains 
or value-free zones: human rights and values – including individual freedoms 
and privacy – are at the core of each of these. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has underscored – at often shocking scale – the urgent need for competent 
state interventions and capable leadership. It has heightened awareness, 
too, of the need to ensure that state intervention is infused with respect for 
individual rights.
Ensuring that liberal values are fully integrated and 
clearly articulated is essential, and this will require 
the US and its democratic partners to hold each other 
accountable on these values.
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